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Introduction: Authorship as Accountability 
 
 
 “To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on the text, to furnish it with a final 
signified, to close the writing… when the Author has been found, the text is ‘explained’ – 
a victory to the critic” (Barthes 147). With these prophetic words penned in 1967, Roland 
Barthes signaled a seismic shift in literary studies. In order to open a text, he argued, the 
reader must reject the author’s authority in order to liberate her own interpretive 
potential. While his attack on the author’s absolute claim to meaning is difficult to 
challenge, the resolution of his claim remains subject to debate. After all, how does a text 
acquire meaning if not from its author? How can we escape the author’s influence if 
every word invariably leads us back to her creative mind? Is not the search for meaning, 
in the end, a search for the author’s presence? Tempting as it is to upend the author’s 
control, we should instead incorporate her intentions into our own understanding of a 
text. Far from limiting our interpretive scope, such an approach would expand the text 
into a dialogic encounter, one where meaning is no longer contested but developed and 
exchanged. Needless to say, the notion of authorial presence gives rise to its own 
problems. Namely, how does one articulate such an elusive and slippery concept? And 
how does this affect our own reading and interpretation of a text?  
 In what follows, I will approach these questions through the theoretical 
framework of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), referencing his oeuvre in an effort to 
circumscribe and expound authorial presence. In order to do this my thesis will draw 
upon “The Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” (ca. 1920-2), “Discourse in the 
Novel” (1941), and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (originally published in 1929 and 
re-published in 1963), all in an attempt to synthesize his most pertinent ideas into a 
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coherent definition of textual presence. After establishing this approach, I will then 
attempt to unearth authorial presence in three novels: Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov (written in 1880, serialized 1879-80), William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! 
(1936), and Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955). From the polyphony of voices in The 
Brothers Karamazov and Absalom, Absalom! to the subsuming consciousness of 
Humbert Humbert in Lolita, each text poses a unique challenge to discerning the author’s 
intentions and thus provides fertile ground for testing the pliability of Bakhtin’s ideas. In 
each study I hope to demonstrate both the capabilities and limits of Bakhtin’s approach, 
constructing his theoretical scaffolding while simultaneously noting where it fails.  
 For Bakhtin, authorship ultimately amounts to a question of responsibility. 
Through the act of writing, “the author assumes an answerable position in the event of 
being, deals with the constituents of this event, and, hence, the work he produces is also a 
constituent of that event” (“The Author and Hero” 190). In other words, he considers 
aesthetic activity to be a deeply ethical enterprise. As a creator, the author brings the text 
into the world through her artistry alone, accounting for its subject matter and aesthetic 
properties. Far from innocent, then, she becomes “answerable” to her readers and 
consequently must stand trial to any indictment of her work, ethical or otherwise. In this 
sense, the author’s answerability bridges the gap between art and reality. As opposed to 
existing in a vacuum, the text retains the traces of its creator and thus marks the 
intersection of her creative freedom and real-world responsibility. As Bakhtin himself 
explains, “Art and life are not one, but they must become united in myself –– in the unity 
of my answerability” (“Art and Answerability” 2). Yet if we are to accept Bakhtin’s 
assertion of authorship as a form of answerability, the question immediately comes to the 
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fore: Is there a limit to creative expression? Or does the author exercise unbridled 
freedom, where anything and everything is permissible? In light of these questions, the 
problem of authorial presence assumes greater significance. Beyond elucidating the text, 
the author’s presence grounds the work in the “event of being” and thereby opens it to 
serious ethical consideration.  
 Notably, Bakhtin frames this “event of being” as an interaction between the 
author and reader. “The author,” he tells us, “must be understood first of all from the 
event of a work as a participant in that event and as an authoritative guide for the reader 
in that event” (“Author and Hero” 207; my emphasis). Simply stated, the novelistic event 
involves three components: the author, the text, and the reader.  Traversing both spatial 
and temporal boundaries, the author communicates with the reader by means of the text, 
acting as her “authoritative guide” to the novel’s content. Of course, this relationship 
deserves further explication; after all, what does it mean for an author to “guide” our 
interpretation of a text? The answer, Bakhtin seems to suggest, lies in the concept of 
form. In contrast to content, which accounts for the text’s actions and events, form refers 
to the author’s stylistic composition of the work as a whole. From rhythm to diction, 
metaphor to imagery, form enables the author to filter the novel’s events and thereby 
influence our reception of the work’s content. Apart from its immediate aesthetic value, 
then, form expresses “the active, axiological relationship of the author-creator… to 
content” and thus plays an integral role in endowing the text with meaning (“Discourse” 
306). Crucial here is Bakhtin’s emphasis on the “axiological” aspect of form. By shaping 
our perception of the work’s content through stylistic techniques, the author ingrains the 
Weaver 7 
text with a discernible attitude toward its subject matter and thereby limits our 
interpretive freedom as readers.  
 Above all else, Bakhtin recognizes discourse to be the defining feature of the 
novel’s form. As opposed to containing a single, unified language, he defines the novel as 
an “artistically organized system for bringing together different languages in contact 
with one another” (“Discourse” 361). By appropriating different languages found in 
reality, the novelist structures the text as an arrangement of discourses. From religious 
diction to legal jargon, she presents the novel’s events through varying discursive lenses, 
weaving the text together into a linguistic tapestry. What language, then, belongs to the 
author? To answer paradoxically, all and none of them. While the novelist owns each 
language in the sense that she employs them as a means of creative expression, she 
nevertheless stops short of occupying a single discourse, assuming a position external to 
language instead. “The author does not speak in a given language… but he speaks, as it 
were, through language, a language that has somehow more or less materialized, become 
objectified, that he merely ventriloquates” (“Discourse” 299). That is to say, the author 
communicates with the reader indirectly, using discourse to reverberate her artistic aims. 
A Bakhtinian approach, then, focuses not on what the novelist writes about but how she 
discursively presents it. By examining the way in which each discourse frames its 
content, we may then work backwards and approximate the author’s motives for 
choosing one discourse over the others at her disposal.  
 Importantly, the novelist’s linguistic juxtaposition succeeds in creating meaning 
due to the ideologies that underlie each discourse. Anything but neutral, social discourses 
function as “specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in 
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words…. each characterized by its own objects, meanings, and values” (Bakhtin, 
“Discourse” 291-92). With the passage of time, every discourse develops specific 
connotations that reflect the worldviews of its social body. To quote Maria Shevtsova, 
every word “carries all meanings it has acquired in society in whichever area of activity 
language is used” (754). Yet rather than hindering the novelist, the ideological nature of 
discourse allows her to subtly mediate our reception of the work’s content. Instead of 
focusing on a word’s denotation, she chooses her language based on the connotations that 
each discourse evokes. Whereas childish discourse might frame an event as light-hearted, 
medical discourse might present the same event as morbid and grim, thereby conjuring a 
completely different scene in the reader’s mind. Thus, as Lewis Bagby reminds us, we 
must consider each word in “relation to another word, utterance, context, message, or 
medium” in order to fully appreciate the author’s intentions (37). Novelistic language 
does not exist in a vacuum but carries with it ideological weight, a characteristic that 
must be incorporated into any analysis of a literary text.   
 Thus considered, Bakhtinian authorial presence manifests in the author’s 
discursive presentation of content. By strategically directing our perception through 
discursive filters, the novelist narrows the text’s interpretability and instils the work with 
a discernible attitude attributable to an author-figure. In this respect, Bakhtin’s theories 
enable us to articulate authorial presence in concrete, textual terms. Though by no means 
authoritative, his framework calls attention to the stylistic decisions that reflect the 
author’s conscious attempts to influence the reader’s interpretation and thereby supply 
the text with meaning. Taking this into account, one can outline the author’s presence by 
first selecting an idea and tracing its discursive transformations, using these instances to 
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then approximate her presence as personal stance within the text itself. Of course, such an 
approach grossly oversimplifies the challenges inherent to determining an author’s 
purpose. After all, what prevents an author from being insincere, cunning, if not 
intentionally misleading? How do we approach an opaque text in which the author seems 
to resist meaning altogether? And above all, how do we account for the seemingly 
infinite number of interpretations a single text can yield? 
 To this last point, one must return to the relationship between the author and 
reader as participants in the “event of being.” As I explained above, the author’s 
enterprise is both active and creative; tapping the social sphere, she constructs the text by 
filtering her work through discursive lenses, all in an effort to guide the reader’s 
interpretation. Rather than passively accepting the text, however, the reader assumes an 
active position of her own. In an attempt to derive meaning, she takes the author’s words 
and reevaluates them according to her own knowledge and social biases. Accordingly, the 
reader’s interaction with the text forms a unique and individualized experience, often 
resulting in an interpretation at odds with the author’s. For this reason, the reader’s 
relation to the author “is not co-experiencing any longer, but co-creation” (“Author and 
Hero” 66; my emphasis). To invoke David Patterson,  
 
the language of a novel resides neither in the novelist nor in the reader but in a 
system of discourses between the two. And since the novel’s language system is 
open-ended, the word here is never the last word nor the ultimate meaning. (136) 
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Try as she might to ingrain a novel with a single meaning, the author cannot account for 
the various predispositions each reader brings to the text. Without the proper knowledge 
or experience, a reader may fail to perceive the nuances specific to each discourse and 
thereby lose sight of the author’s message. Conversely, a reader might evaluate the 
author’s discourses based on connotations specific to her own social milieu and 
consequently impose the text with an interpretation distinct from the author’s. In any 
case, one should not lose sight of the author’s advantage over the reader as the creator of 
the work. Although the reader assumes an active role of her own, the author restricts her 
creative enterprise by means of discursive boundaries. Hence, in order to form one’s own 
reading of a text, one must always bear in mind the author’s stylistic decisions that 
inform her own interpretation.   
 In the following chapters, I will approach each novel with this problem in mind, 
examining each author’s discursive presence in order to examine its influence on our 
interpretations as readers. To do this, I find it necessary to first establish my own 
understanding of authorial presence for the purposes of this study. In each chapter, I will 
only consider the author insofar as he represents the creative mind responsible for the 
text. In other words, my study only will draw its conclusions on textual evidence, setting 
the author’s biographical information to the side. Though an author’s biography is 
undoubtedly important to literary analysis, my interests lie in deducing each author’s 
presence to the extent that it manifests in his discursive decisions alone. For the same 
reason, I will not incorporate any of the author’s extra-textual writings (interviews, 
journals, letters, etc.) into my study.1 Instead, my project will assess each author’s 
                                                        
1 I will, however, consider Nabokov’s afterword in my analysis of Lolita.  
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presence as an axiological attitude toward the work’s content. By isolating a single idea 
central to each text and examining its discursive presentation, I will attempt to uncover 
the decisions underlying each discourse in order to determine the author’s intended 
reception of the idea.  
 In my first chapter, I will consider Dostoevsky’s textual presence in The Brothers 
Karamazov with respect to his discursive presentation of Ivan’s thesis, in which he boldly 
asserts that “everything is permitted.” The Brothers Karamazov provides a fruitful point 
of departure due to Bakhtin’s extensive analysis of Dostoevsky as a “polyphonic” writer. 
In contrast to monologic writers, who dominate their characters and subordinate their 
ideas, Bakhtin claims that Dostoevsky occupies an egalitarian position in the text, voicing 
his ideas on the same plane as his characters. Using the above framework, I will contest 
Bakhtin’s polyphonic theory by outlining Dostoevsky’s negative portrayal of “everything 
is permitted.” Whether dressing the thesis in religious diction to present it as a spiritual 
crisis or surrounding it with conspiratorial discourse to underscore its destructive 
potential, Dostoevsky exploits his structural advantage over Ivan and passes his thesis 
through a series of undermining discourses. In this fashion, he implicitly condemns the 
idea through the text’s discursive arrangement and presents “everything is permitted” as 
an impractical and wholly immoral approach to life. Guiding our interpretation by means 
of discursive filters, he exposes the philosophy for all its flaws and invites us to assess the 
idea with a similar sense of skepticism and disapproval.  
 Following The Brothers Karamazov, I will jump ahead a half century to Absalom, 
Absalom! which I will examine with regard to Faulkner’s portrayal of history. Like The 
Brothers Karamazov, Absalom, Absalom! bears the semblance of a polyphonic text, 
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featuring a multitude of autonomous voices that take turns relating the legacy of Thomas 
Sutpen. Yet instead of employing these voices in order to form an authorial evaluation of 
Sutpen’s life, Faulkner shatters the past into irreconcilable discursive perspectives and 
consequently muddles our perception of Sutpen as a human being. Needless to say, his 
inconsistent depiction of the Sutpen story poses a significant problem to Bakhtin’s 
axiological approach. Refusing to depict the past in a straightforward manner, he layers 
Sutpen’s legacy with competing narratives that complicate any attempt to discern a single 
authorial perspective. Thus, in place of an ethical stance, Faulkner’s textual presence 
surfaces in his efforts to present history as a linguistic construct composed of discourse. 
By contrasting conflicting narrations, he calls attention to the distortive potential of 
language and demonstrates its capability to reimage the past by means of discourse. 
Beyond simply telling a tale, then, he encourages his readers to examine each falsifying 
narration in relation to one another and come to realize the incongruent relationship 
between language and the past.  
 For my third and perhaps most daunting chapter, I will approach Nabokov’s 
textual presence in Lolita insofar as it appears in his presentation of Humbert Humbert’s 
pedophilia. Here, my study will examine the text in light of the novel’s afterword, where 
Nabokov professes his resistance to taking an ethical stance. As opposed to condemning 
or condoning Humbert’s actions, he claims to turn away from ethics altogether, offering 
the text as a source of aesthetic pleasure. Assuming he succeeds in doing this, Nabokov’s 
presence cannot be attributed to an ethical stance regarding Humbert’s behavior. But, as I 
hope to show, his discursive arrangement evinces a far more profound ethical position. 
By handing over the novel’s narration to Humbert, Nabokov allows his devious narrator 
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to idealize his actions and thereby manipulate the reader’s reception of the alleged 
memoir’s content. Yet instead of giving Humbert complete control over the narrative, he 
undercuts his hero by means of metafictional devices and undermining discourses, 
allowing the reader to momentarily escape Humbert’s influence and remember the ethical 
responsibilities inherent to reading a work of fiction. Crucially, Nabokov’s efforts to 
subvert Humbert do not amount to an indictment but thrust the ethical burden of the 
novel onto the reader. Placed in a struggle between content and form, the reader must 
continually combat Humbert’s prose in order to see past his deception and make an 
ethical judgement of his conduct.  
 In each of these novels, the author prompts the reader to reflect on the relationship 
between language and reality. From Dostoevsky’s indictment of ‘everything is permitted” 
to Faulkner and Nabokov’s meta-reflection on discourse, each text enables its readers to 
study language’s distortive capability and then apply that information to the world at 
large. “The aesthetic act,” Bakhtin writes, “gives birth to being on a new axiological 
plane of the world: a new human being is born and a new axiological context—a new 
plane of thinking about the human world” (“Author and Hero” 191). Beyond entertaining 
us, literature prompts us to think and thereby enriches our understanding of the 
surrounding world. To this end, authorial presence plays a crucial role; by guiding our 
interpretation of a text, the author speaks with us, instructs us, sharing her outlook and 
expanding our own. Thus, to ignore the author’s presence is to limit the text, to close 
communications and disregard the wisdom of others. At the end of his essay, Barthes 
calls for the author’s head, insisting that “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the 
death of the author” (Barthes 148). Yet as Bakhtin shows us, the true cost of such 
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violence would be the death of dialogue. Authorial presence is not an imposition; instead, 
it is a form of communion, bridging the gap between the author and reader and allowing 





































Chapter 1: Trial by Discourse: Discursive Condemnation in The Brothers 
Karamazov 
 
“In the novel…. the ethical intention is visible in the creation of every detail and hence is, 
in its most concrete content, an effective structural element of the work itself” (72) 
Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel 
 
 The search for authorial presence is not unlike a trial. As readers, we assume the 
role of detectives, scouring each page for evidence and indicting the author based on our 
findings. In the end, we hold the author responsible for her writing and judge her work 
according to a set of principles, whether they be ethical or aesthetic. Appropriately, we 
might look no further than Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (Brat'ja 
Karamazovy, written in 1880, serialized 1879-1880) to begin our search. Between its 
crime-propelled narrative and moralizing characters, The Brothers Karamazov centers on 
a question of responsibility, most notably concerning the murder of Fyodor Karamazov. 
While the obvious culprit is Smerdyakov, the patriarch’s lackey who carries out the deed, 
Dostoevsky complicates this verdict by implicating Ivan, whose thesis “everything is 
permitted” directly inspires the crime. From this perspective, The Brothers Karamazov 
serves as an indictment of Ivan’s nihilistic philosophy. Through his discursive handling 
of the idea, Dostoevsky encourages the reader to condemn Ivan’s thesis and weigh his 
culpability as an ideological accomplice. In this sense, he enters the text as a guiding 
light, exposing the destructive potential of “everything is permitted” and leading his 
readers toward an ethical judgement of Ivan.  
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 Beyond its themes of accountability and ethics, The Brothers Karamazov lends 
itself to a Bakhtinian analysis to a great extent due to Bakhtin’s preoccupation with 
Dostoevsky’s creative output. As the main subject of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
(Problemy Pojetiki Dostoevskogo, originally published in 1929 and re-published in 
1963), Dostoevsky lies at the heart of Bakhtin’s polyphonic theory of the novel. In this 
work, Bakhtin hails his compatriot as the first polyphonic novelist, an author who creates 
“free people, capable of standing alongside their creator, capable of not agreeing with 
him and even of rebelling against him” (Problems 6). As opposed to existing within a 
hierarchy, he contends, Dostoevsky engages his characters as indomitable others by 
endowing them with knowledge equal to his own. As Caryl Emerson explains: “When 
polyphonic writers ‘come down to earth’ and address their creations not vertically but 
horizontally, they are designing their characters to know, potentially, as much as authors 
know” (127). Due to this newfound parity, Dostoevsky exists “alongside” his creations 
and thus achieves a radically new position in the text. No longer dominating his creations, 
he descends to their plane in order to liberate their voices and engage with them as 
equals.  
 Thanks to this humble authorial position, Bakhtin characterizes Dostoevsky’s 
interactions with his characters as a democratic exchange of ideas. Unlike a monologic 
author, who crafts her characters’ ideas in order to support or refute them, Dostoevsky 




Dostoevsky was capable of representing someone else’s idea, presenting its full 
capacity while at the same time also preserving a distance, neither confirming the 
idea not merging it with his own expressed ideology. (Problems 85) 
 
Rather than subjugating his characters, Bakhtin argues, Dostoevsky respects their 
independence by “preserving a distance” and acknowledging their point of view as an 
equally valid claim to the truth. For this reason, his creative world “is not a world of 
objects, illuminated and ordered by his monologic thought, but a world of 
consciousnesses mutually illuminating one another” (Problems 97). Each character 
contributes his or her own perspective in concert with Dostoevsky, reflecting the 
disparate and diverse range of beliefs found in reality. Recognizing his place within this 
system, Dostoevsky offers his own viewpoint as one of many, rejecting a privileged 
position and taking his place among his fellow consciousnesses.  
 Bakhtin’s polyphonic theory, however, warrants a reassessment. After all, how 
can Dostoevsky exist alongside his characters when he accounts for each and every one 
of their thoughts, actions, and beliefs? To this point, Bakhtin would likely counter with 
the concept of unfinalizability: “It is given to all of Dostoevsky’s characters to ‘think and 
seek higher things’; in each of them there is a ‘great and unresolved thought’… And in 
this resolution of a thought (an idea) lies their entire real life and their own personal 
unfinalizability” (Problems 87). Instead of committing to a single outlook or belief, 
“Dostoevsky’s heroes are endlessly trying to resolve the unresolvable, to solve the 
insolutable, to cross uncrossable boundaries” (Jackson 291). In this pursuit of the truth, 
they stave off Dostoevsky’s finalizing word and reserve the right to change, modify, or 
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reject their own ideas. Still, Bakhtin’s theory downplays Dostoevsky’s inherent 
advantage over his characters. Though he grants them autonomy to a certain extent, he 
nevertheless holds the power to subvert, condemn, or discredit their ideas by presenting 
them through biased discursive filters. By doing so, he guides the reader’s reception of 
each character’s beliefs and embeds his stance into the text not as a competing idea but as 
an ideological framework that orders the text. In this sense, Dostoevsky always holds the 
upper hand, as he maintains the ability to influence the reader’s interpretation of each 
idea.  
 To return to Ivan’s thesis, then, Bakhtin’s egalitarian theory of authorial presence 
must be confronted with Dostoevsky’s discursive portrayal of “everything is permitted.” 
Does Dostoevsky succeed in distancing himself from the idea and allowing it flourish 
among other beliefs? Or does he evaluate the idea by means of discourse, encouraging 
the reader to condemn the thesis as impractical, naïve, if not immoral? In “Split 
Consciousness and Characterization,” Ulrich Schmid argues for the latter interpretation in 
his own study of The Brothers Karamazov: 
 
It can be argued, however, that Dostoevsky in fact operates with a distinct 
hierarchy of values and expresses his own ideological preferences clearly. The 
action of the novel is propelled by the incongruence between the value 
preferences of the protagonists on one side and of the author on the other side. 
This discrepancy is resolved either positively or negatively: the protagonist can 
acquire the author’s truth, or tragically fail. (778) 
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In Schmid’s view, Dostoevsky never cedes power to his creations but structures his work 
according to his own “hierarchy of values.” This value system, he suggests, forms the 
backbone of the text: characters can either conform to it or fail, with no room in between. 
On these grounds, Bakhtin’s anti-hierarchical model should be met with skepticism. 
Though his emphasis on the idea in Dostoevsky’s work is insightful, his theory 
underestimates Dostoevsky’s structural edge as the text’s creator. Try as he might to 
elevate the ideas of his characters, his discursive framing inevitably bespeaks his own 
position and subordinates his characters to a plane beneath him.  
 Prior to unearthing Dostoevsky’s textual presence, however, a distinction must 
first be drawn between the presence of the author and the narrator. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, the author stands outside of language and acts as an organizer instead, 
assembling the text into an arrangement of discourses. This being the case, the author 
employs the narrator as yet another character not to be mistaken for his own voice. As 
Bakhtin explains: 
 
The author is not to be found in the language of the narrator… but rather, the 
author utilizes now one language, now another, in order to avoid giving himself 
up wholly to either of them; he makes use of this verbal give-and-take, this 
dialogue of languages at every point of his work in order that he himself might 
remain as it were neutral with regard to language, a third party in a quarrel 
between two people though he might be a biased party (“Discourse” 314). 
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Far from neutral, the narrator functions as a view onto the world like any other character, 
complete with her own values and beliefs. Importantly, however, the narrator differs in 
the sense that she accounts for the text’s descriptions. While one should not mistake her 
words as the direct opinion of the author, she nevertheless plays an integral role in 
framing the events of the novel and thus communicating the author’s intended vision. To 
examine her discourse, then, one must determine her own discursive tendencies and 
consider them in relation to the author’s possible intentions. 
 In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky demarcates the narrator’s presence by 
positioning him as a real person who exists concurrently with the other characters of the 
text. This biographical context helps solidify the narrator into a discernable, 
individualized voice; unlike an outside observer, who relates the story’s events 
externally, the narrator lives among his subjects and even participates in some of the 
novel’s events. Dostoevsky establishes this narratorial voice in the novel’s opening line:   
 
Алексей Федорович Карамазов был третьим сыном помещика нашего уезда 
Федора Павловича Карамазова, столь известного в свое время (да и теперь 
еще у нас припоминаемого) (6) 
 
Alexei Fyodorovich Karamazov was the third son of a landowner from our 
district, Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, well known in his own day (and still 
remembered among us) (7)2 
                                                        
2 Throughout this chapter, I provide my own translations in addition to using Richard Pevear and Larissa 
Volokhonsky’s 1990 translation. Passages marked with a page number refer to Pevear and Volokhonsky’s 
edition, whereas translations enclosed by brackets indicate my own variants.  
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As the first-person plural pronouns “our” (nashego) and “us” (nas) indicate, the narrator 
identifies as a member of the town’s community and claims to be familiar with the 
town’s patriarch, Fyodor Pavlovich. Apart from demonstrating his credibility, these 
personalized markers allow Dostoevsky to immediately establish the narrator as a distinct 
voice within the text. By doing so, he distances himself from the narrator’s voice and 
encourages the reader to view the narrator as yet another language in his “verbal give-
and-take.” 
 Dostoevsky further distinguishes the narrator through his markedly colloquial 
register. Throughout the novel, he models the narrator after a provincial storyteller, 
coloring his speech with common vernacular. One example of this appears in the 
narrator’s use of diminutive nouns. Abandoning a neutral tone, he employs such word 
forms in order to express his own attitude toward his subject matter. Consider, for 
instance, his description of Ivan’s encounter with a drunken peasant:  
 
Иван Федорович вдруг повстречал одинокого пьяного, маленького ростом 
мужиченка, в заплатанном зипунишке, шагавшего зигзагами, ворчавшего и 
бранившегося (671) 
 
[Literally: Ivan Fyodorovich suddenly met a solitary drunk little peasant in a 
pathetic patched coat, who was walking in zigzags, grumbling and swearing] 
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Though lost in translation, the diminutive nouns “muzhichenka” (little peasant) and 
“zipunishke” (pathetic coat) evince the narrator’s contempt for the peasant. In this 
respect, the narrator’s personality and judgement seeps into his speech, providing him 
with a concrete presence within the text. This in turn allows Dostoevsky to speak through 
the narrator’s language. “Behind the narrator’s story we read a second story, the author’s 
story; he is the one who tells us how the narrator tells stories” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 
314). In other words, the narrator primarily functions as a discursive lens, one that the 
Dostoevsky deploys in order to frame the novel’s events through a specific point of view. 
Separate from Dostoevsky, the narrator holds his own worldviews that inform his speech 
and consequently shape his narration as well. 
 In contrast to the narrator, Dostoevsky equips Ivan with a far more intellectual 
range of discourses, including rhetoric and rationality. He does so in order to depict Ivan 
as a free-thinking atheist with a proclivity for reason, who lambasts the church and state 
with equal fervor. This characterization becomes especially important with respect to his 
thesis. Declaring the death of God and morality with it, he advocates for a new age of 
existential freedom:  
 
То всякому, сознающему уже и теперь истину, позволительно устроиться 
совершенно как ему угодно, на новых началах. В этом смысле ему «все 
позволено». Мало того… так как Бога и бессмертия все-таки нет, то новому 
человеку позволительно стать человеко-богом (703) 
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anyone who already knows this truth is permitted to settle things for himself, 
absolutely as he wishes, on the new principles. In this sense, ‘everything is 
permitted’ to him. Moreover, since God and immortality do not exist in any 
case… the new man is allowed to become a man-god (649)  
 
In this context, his idea finds credibility in the language of philosophy. Each line of his 
thesis appears shrewd and well-though-out, bolstered by the argumentative conjunctions 
“in this sense” (v jetom smysle) and “moreover” (malo togo). Combined with his assertive 
tone and muscular reasoning, his ideas comes across as sophisticated and persuasive, if 
not entirely realistic. In this regard, Dostoevsky seems to respect Ivan’s convictions. By 
presenting the argument in a lucid and insightful manner, he grants Ivan the space 
necessary to advance his thesis as an equal.  
 Compelling as this example may be, Dostoevsky’s attitude toward the thesis 
appears significantly more critical when placed in the mouth of other characters. Though 
the idea finds it origin in Ivan, it is by no means exclusive to him, existing instead in a 
constant state of exchange and reevaluation. “The idea,” Bakhtin writes, “is inter-
individual and inter-subjective – the realm of its existence is not individual consciousness 
but dialogic communion between consciousnesses” (Problems 88). Thus, his thesis must 
be considered in light of its “inter-individual” existence, or more concretely, the way in 
which different characters articulate the idea. Whereas a lawyer might phrase it one way, 
a doctor might understand it differently, each offering their own approach. Given the 
endless array of discourses at Dostoevsky’s disposal, however, each perspective should 
be regarded as deliberate and purposeful. With each discourse, he introduces a new 
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outlook on the idea, presenting the reader with one interpretation over another. 
Accordingly, Bakhtin encourages us to continually question: How does each discourse 
portray the idea? And what does Dostoevsky seek to achieve through each of these 
viewpoints?  
 To give an example, Dostoevsky reshapes the idea through childish discourse in 
Book X, where the schoolboy Kolya adopts Ivan’s argument in order to rationalize an 
immature prank. After convincing a peasant to decapitate a goose, Kolya denies any 
culpability by downplaying his involvement in the incident:  
 
А парень все ревет как баба: «Это не я, говорит, это он меня наустил» – да 
на меня и показывает. Я отвечаю с полным хладнокровием, что я отнюдь не 
учил, что я только выразил основную мысль и говорил лишь в проекте. (593) 
 
And the fellow kept hollowing like a woman: ‘It wasn’t me, he made me do it,’ 
and he pointed at me. I answered with complete equanimity that I had by no 
means made him to do it, that I had merely stated the basic idea and was speaking 
only hypothetically. (549) 
 
With this defense, Kolya puts Ivan’s thesis into effect, rejecting moral responsibility by 
reducing his complicity to a “basic idea” (osnovnaja mysl'). In a world where “everything 
is permitted,” he feels empowered to promote senseless slaughter while simultaneously 
denying accountability. Yet in Kolya’s mouth, Ivan’s idea diminishes into the lame 
justification of a juvenile trick. No longer attached to an esteemed thinker, the idea 
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weakens and deflates, appropriated by a disobedient child. As Robert Belknap notes, 
Kolya “echoes Ivan and cheapens Ivan. The pride of sinful humanity becomes the 
stubbornness of a pathetic child” (772). Indeed, by filtering Ivan’s philosophy through 
Kolya, Dostoevsky highlights the destructive naiveté that underlies the boy’s thesis. In 
comparison to Ivan’s experience and reason, Kolya reaches the same conclusion because 
of his youth and immaturity. Taking this into account, Dostoevsky includes this episode 
in order to parody the thesis, demonstrating how the same philosophy used to critique 
transcendent morality can be applied by a child avoiding punishment.  
 More significantly, Dostoevsky rephrases the thesis using religious discourse in 
Book II, where the elder Zosima reinterprets the idea to be a product of spiritual distress. 
As a representative of the Church, Zosima acts as the religious counterweight to Ivan’s 
rigid rationality, offering a Christian reading of the otherwise atheistic idea. In response 
to hearing the idea for the first time at the monastery, Zosima asks Ivan about his 
convictions and goes on to question his resolve:  
 
Идея эта еще не решена в вашем сердце и мучает его. Но и мученик любит 
иногда забавляться своим отчаянием, как бы тоже от отчаяния… В вас этот 
вопрос не решен и в этом ваше великое горе, ибо настоятельно требует 
разрешения... (76) 
 
[Lit: This idea is not yet resolved in your heart and torments it. But a martyr, too, 
sometimes likes to toy with his despair, as if also from despair… In you the 
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question is not resolved, and therein lies your great grief, for it urgently demands 
resolution…] 
 
Rather than acknowledging him as a thinker, Zosima appropriates Ivan’s irresolution to 
fit the paradigm of a struggling believer. By comparing him to a “martyr” (muchenik) and 
pointing out the “despair” (otchajanijе) that “torments” (muchaet) his heart, Zosima 
transforms Ivan’s intellectual struggle into a state of spiritual anguish, likening his doubts 
to that of a despondent martyr. Importantly, Zosima’s diagnosis of “everything is 
permitted” coincides with the thesis’ first appearance. In this sense, the elder’s words 
establish an interpretive dichotomy from the onset; whereas Ivan attributes his theory to 
rationality, Zosima offers a second reading, one that unmasks the idea to be the byproduct 
of spiritual distress. Through this binary, Dostoevsky invites us to look at the idea as both 
a hardened philosophical concept and a step toward spiritual fulfillment. Though he stops 
short of endorsing either perspective, his inclusion of this binary casts doubt upon the 
thesis and invariably complicates our reading of it.  
 Like Zosima, many critics maintain that Ivan never fully commits to his thesis or 
believes in its practicality. Closer to an abstract postulate than a hardened belief, his 
thesis reflects his intellectual activity as a philosopher and only represents a single theory 
in a greater search for the truth. In the words of Vladimir Kantor: 
 
Ivan himself does not believe in the possibility of a practical realization of the 
idea that ‘all is permitted’… And when he informs Smerdyakov that he is going to 
Chermashnya, it is as if he is continuing (for himself) his own strange theoretical 
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game, as if he is positing to himself the same question all the time: but is this 
possible in reality? (710) 
 
Regardless of whether or not Ivan accepts his thesis, his uncertainty should be considered 
in light of Dostoevsky’s possible intentions. Is he gifting Ivan with unfinalizability? Or 
does he aim to discredit the idea from the start, depicting the thesis as unrealistic even to 
its originator? Assuming the latter, Ivan’s “theoretical game” begins to resemble a 
cautionary tale; as opposed to giving the thesis a fair chance, Dostoevsky seems to 
challenge “everything is permitted” upon its introduction, inviting the reader to take a 
similarly skeptical stance. With no zealous supporter to defend the idea in earnest, the 
thesis becomes vulnerable to Dostoevsky’s discursive framing and consequently acquires 
a position within his “hierarchy of values.”  
 If Ivan is indeed testing the limits of his thesis, this experiment begins to unravel 
as he realizes his own complicity in his father’s murder. Reflecting on the vulnerable 
state he left his father in by leaving for Chermashnya as well as his last conversation with 
Smerdyakov, he begins to weigh his own responsibility for Fyodor Pavlovich’s death. 
Yet instead of transcending guilt in the true fashion of a “man-god” (cheloveko-bogom), 
he attempts to conspire with Smerdyakov in order to conceal his involvement. With this 
goal in mind, his speech becomes opaque and coded in what might best be characterized 
as conspiratorial discourse. Abandoning clarity in favor of cryptic hints, he encourages 
his former lackey to withhold evidence from the investigators at the conclusion of their 
first meeting:  
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«До свидания. Я, впрочем про то, что ты притвориться умеешь, не скажу... 
да и тебе советую не показывать,» – проговорил вдруг почему-то Иван. 
(659) 
 
[Lit: ‘Good-bye. By the way, I won’t mention that you know how to sham … and 
I advise you not to testify to it,’ Ivan said suddenly for some reason.] 
 
Although Ivan poses this suggestion in the guise of advice, his message is unmistakably 
symbiotic. In exchange for his compliance, Ivan offers Smerdyakov his silence, 
promising not to disclose his ability “to sham” (pritvorit'sja) in hopes of misguiding the 
investigation. More than a recommendation, then, his words insinuate an underlying 
proposal, an offer that Smerdyakov immediately picks up on:  
 
«Оченно понимаю-с… А коли вы этого не покажете, то и я-с всего нашего с 
вами разговору тогда у ворот не объявлю...» (659) 
 
‘I understand ver-ry well, sir. And since you won’t testify about that, sir, I also 
will not report the whole of our conversation by the gate that time …’ (609) 
 
Crucial here is Smerdyakov’s adoption of conspiratorial discourse; by structuring his 
response as a quid pro quo, the lackey reciprocates Ivan’s speech patterns and thereby 
intimates his willingness to collude. What is more, he encodes his speech with servant 
speak (“ponimaju-s” and “ja-s”) in a similar effort to communicate implicitly. Despite the 
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meeting’s informality, he embellishes his servility in order to signal his intent to play 
along. Through this discursive parallel, Dostoevsky deepens the conspiratorial 
relationship between the two men and calls attention to Ivan’s budding guilt. Unable to 
ignore his conscience, Ivan resorts to collusion, an act that directly defies his amoral 
philosophy. By way of this contradiction, Dostoevsky illustrates the limits of “everything 
is permitted,” showing that while feasible in the abstract, its doctrines remain 
unrealizable when placed in reality.  
 Ivan’s hypocrisy becomes especially apparent during his third meeting with 
Smerdyakov, where the former cites “everything is permitted” as the main impetus 
behind the murder. Whereas Ivan merely entertains the idea in the abstract, Smerdyakov 
takes the thesis a step further and translates its principles to reality, forcing Ivan to 
acknowledge the destructive consequences of such a philosophy. After revealing himself 
to be the culprit, Smerdyakov goes on to rationalize his actions: 
 
Была такая прежняя мысль-с, что с такими деньгами жизнь начну, в Москве, 
али пуще того за границей, такая мечта была-с, а пуще все потому, что «все 
позволено.» Это вы вправду меня учили-с, ибо много вы мне тогда этого 
говорили: ибо коли бога бесконечного нет, то и нет никакой добродетели, да 
и не надобно ее тогда вовсе. Это вы вправду. Так я и рассудил. (683) 
 
There was such a former thought, sir, that I could begin a life on such money in 
Moscow, or even more so abroad, I did have such a dream sir, and even more so 
as ‘everything is permitted.’ It was true what you taught me, sir, because you told 
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me a lot about that back then: because if there’s no infinite God, then there’s no 
virtue either, and no need of it at all. It was true. That’s how I reasoned. (632) 
 
Smerdyakov’s confession contorts the thesis into a sinister justification for murder. 
Refuting both the existence of an “infinite god” (bog beskonechnyj) and “virtue” 
(dobrodetel'), he adopts Ivan’s exact language in an attempt to exonerate himself of 
responsibility. Moreover, his insistence on Ivan’s influence (“It was true what you taught 
me”) directly implicates Ivan in the crime. Though Ivan had no direct role in the murder, 
his thesis empowers the lackey to kill his father guilt-free, making him an ideological 
accomplice. In response to this interpretation, Kantor argues that “part of Dostoevsky’s 
intention is that it must at last become clear to the reader that Ivan is a spiritual cover-up 
for Smerdyakov… The lackey does not wish to bear any sort of responsibility. That is 
why he needed Ivan’s permission” (715). Be that as it may, Kantor overlooks the scene as 
an indictment of the thesis itself. Regardless of whether or not we deem Ivan guilty, his 
thesis plays a significant role in the murder and therefore functions as an agent of chaos 
within Dostoevsky’s universe. From this perspective, Dostoevsky uses Smerdyakov’s 
speech to illustrate the harmful effects of the thesis’ implementation.  
 In addition to tying the thesis to the crime, this scene also marks a turning point in 
Ivan’s attitude toward his philosophy. Faced with Fyodor Pavlovich’s death and his 
possible involvement, he becomes overwhelmed with guilt as he realizes the real-world 
consequences of “everything is permitted.” Noticing this inner turmoil, Smerdyakov 




‘Все тогда смелы были-с, "все дескать позволено", говорили-с, а теперь вот 
так испугались!’ (675) 
 
[Lit: ‘You used to be brave once, sir, ‘Everything is permitted,’ you said, sir, and 
now you’re so frightened!’] 
 
Here, his reference to the thesis underscores Ivan’s hypocrisy. Lacking the fortitude to 
stand by his convictions, Ivan cannot help but be “frightened” (ispugalis') by the 
disastrous outcome unleashed by his ideas. In light of this, Smerdyakov responds by 
turning Ivan’s words against him, poking and prodding at his master’s newfound doubts. 
From an authorial standpoint, Smerdyakov’s taunts allow Dostoevsky to emphasize the 
thesis’ impracticality. With each jeer, he calls attention to the irony of Ivan’s suffering, as 
even the idea’s chief spokesperson cannot stomach the execution of his words. In this 
respect, Dostoevsky channels his condemnation through Smerdyakov’s speech and uses 
the lackey’s cruelty to draw out Ivan’s slipping certainty.   
 Given the pivotal nature of Ivan’s meetings with Smerdyakov in the context of his 
ideological trajectory, one cannot help but notice the reemergence of a second, but no less 
important, discourse: religious diction. Following each meeting, the narrator describes 
Ivan’s distress in markedly spiritual terms, likening his struggle to a faith-based crisis. 
Consistent with Zosima’s reading, then, this discursive framework encourages the reader 
to interpret Ivan’s dilemma as a reckoning with his faith, or lack thereof. An example of 
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this occurs after Ivan’s first meeting with Smerdyakov, where his guilt begins to consume 
his thoughts:  
 
Словом, он на время почти забыл о Смердякове. И однако две недели спустя 
после первого к нему посещения, начали его опять мучить все те же 
странные мысли, как и прежде. (661) 
 
[Lit: “In a word, he almost forgot about Smerdyakov for a time. And yet, two 
weeks after his first visit to him, the same strange thoughts again began to torment 
him, as before.”] 
 
A perceptive reader will notice Dostoevsky’s reincorporation of the verb “to torment” 
(muchit'), which initially appears in Zosima’s comments at the monastery. Though subtle, 
the verb’s reappearance reinforces the elder’s perspective and recasts Ivan’s suffering as 
an affliction of the soul. By that same token, the narrator frames Ivan’s decision to self-
testify through a similarly religious lens:    
 
Какая-то словно радость сошла теперь в его душу. Он почувствовал в себе 
какую-то бесконечную твердость: конец колебаниям его, столь ужасно его 
мучившим все последнее время! Решение было взято "и уже не изменится", 
со счастьем подумал он. (685) 
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It was as if a sort of joy now descended into his soul. He felt an infinite firmness 
in himself: the end to his hesitations, which had tormented him so terribly all 
through those last days! The decision was taken, ‘and now will not be changed,’ 
he thought with happiness. (633) 
 
Once more, the narrator echoes Zosima by pointing out the “hesitations” (kolebanija) that 
“tormented” (muchil) Ivan’s mind. Perhaps more revelatory, however, are the narrator’s 
descriptions of Ivan’s newfound bliss. Restored by his resolve to confess, and thus 
renounce his thesis, his soul fills with “infinite firmness” (beskonechnaja tverdost') and 
“joy” (radost') that closely resembles a transcendent state. Like Christian penance, he 
finds absolution by acting according to a higher law, whether that be his conscience, or as 
Dostoevsky seems to suggest, his soul. Still, the question naturally arises: Is religious 
discourse simply a bias of the narrator? Perhaps, but the fact remains that Dostoevsky 
uses the narrator’s speech to guide our interpretation of Ivan’s ideological reevaluation. 
To this end, the narrator’s religious diction serves as an indispensable framing device, 
allowing Dostoevsky to direct our reading of the scene solely by means of discourse.  
 Dostoevsky’s application of religious discourse is by no means exclusive to 
Ivan’s meetings with Smerdyakov, but extends to his encounter with the devil as well. 
Structurally, this episode marks a significant shift in the narrative; departing from realist 
conventions, Dostoevsky conjures the scene in order to represent the internal battle 
raging between Ivan’s former convictions and burgeoning guilt. To quote Kate Holland,   
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With the appearance of the ‘dread spirit,’ apocryphal legend permeates the 
novel’s own structure, flouting the conventions of the realist novel. Denying the 
narrative freedom upon which the realist novel relies, Ivan is condemned to 
wander through his own philosophical hell. (72) 
 
As she perceptively notes, the encounter affords us a peak into the “philosophical hell” of 
Ivan’s mind. No longer in reality, the scene plays out as a manifestation of Ivan’s 
opposing thoughts, in which the devil acts a conduit for his darkest and most deeply 
repressed ideas. Dostoevsky establishes this context in the final sentence of the preceding 
chapter, where Ivan first notices the devil’s presence: 
 
Его видимо что-то там раздражало, какой-то предмет, беспокоило, мучило. 
(686) 
 
[Lit: “Clearly something there irritated him, some object, troubled him, tormented 
him.”] 
 
In light of its previous appearances, the verb “tormented” (muchilo) creates an 
association between Ivan’s previous distressing thoughts and the devil. Through this 
linguistic connection, Dostoevsky conflates the two in order to frame the scene as a 
moment of intense self-reflection. In this sense, the devil “does not represent a true Other: 
he basically parrots Ivan’s own words back to him. This encounter, then, comes off as a 
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supreme manifestation of Ivan’s own solipsism,” where the devil’s speech reveals Ivan’s 
own interpretation of his ideological struggle (Connolly, “Spiritual Epiphany” 51).  
 Similar to Zosima, the devil interprets Ivan’s distress to be indicative of a larger 
spiritual uncertainty. Yet in contrast to the elder, who relates Ivan’s anguish to 
martyrdom, the devil twists this religious reading into a far bleaker vision, stressing the 
futility of his endless vacillation. In response to Ivan’s doubts over his existence, the 
devil refashions his indecision into a case for suicide:  
 
Но колебания, но беспокойство, но борьба веры и неверия, – это ведь такая 
иногда мука для совестливого человека, вот как ты, что лучше повеситься. 
(699) 
 
[Lit: “But hesitation, but anxiety, but the struggle of belief and disbelief – that is 
after all sometimes such a torment for a conscientious man, like you, that it’s better 
to hang oneself.”] 
 
By framing Ivan’s “struggle between belief and disbelief” (bor'ba very i neverija) as a 
vain endeavor best resolved by death, the devil appropriates Zosima’s religious diction in 
order to ridicule Ivan’s wavering convictions. This cynicism takes on even greater 
significance when considered in light of the devil’s hallucinatory existence. As a figment 
of Ivan’s imagination, the devil’s speech represents Ivan’s own thoughts and beliefs. This 
being the case, the devil’s spiritual discourse evinces Ivan’s internalization of Zosima’s 
words; faced with the failure of his thesis, he subconsciously integrates religious diction 
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into his thought process, incarnating this perspective in the form of the devil. Though he 
takes this reading in a darker direction, his acquiescence nevertheless signals his inability 
to reconcile his guilt and thesis through reason alone. In this respect, Dostoevsky 
privileges the elder’s interpretation, allowing it to prevail over Ivan’s rationality. Rather 
than voicing this bias through the narrator, he pushes Ivan to come to this realization 
himself and thereby realigns his hero to fit his own “hierarchy of values.”  
 Of course, one cannot appreciate the full weight of this encounter without 
considering Dostoevsky’s decision to embody Ivan’s thoughts in such a demonic figure. 
By no means coincidental, the devil’s presence infuses the scene with spiritual overtones 
and effectively portrays Ivan’s nightmare as a reckoning with his faith. Brought to the 
brink of madness, Ivan must literally face his demons in order to confront his thesis and 
renounce its tenets in favor of moral responsibility. This face-off reaches a crescendo at 
the end of the chapter, where the devil begins to quote the article in which Ivan first 
outlined the thesis: 
 
Если даже период этот и никогда не наступит, но так как бога и бессмертия 
все-таки нет, то новому человеку позволительно стать человеко-богом… [и] 
с легким сердцем перескочить всякую прежнюю нравственную преграду 
прежнего раба-человека (703) 
 
since God and immortality do not exist in any case, even if this period should 
never come, the new man is allowed to become a man-god… [and] jump 
lightheartedly over any former moral obstacle of the former slave-man (649) 
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Coming from the devil, Ivan cannot help but see his philosophy as diabolic and evil. As 
opposed to promoting existential freedom, the devil hails Ivan’s “man-god” (cheloveko-
bog) in the wake of Fyodor Pavlovich’s death, championing the thesis despite – or 
perhaps because of – its fatal outcome. Notably, Dostoevsky presents this moment as the 
tipping point in Ivan’s ideological trajectory. In a sign of renunciation, Ivan hurls a glass 
at the devil to stop him from reciting the thesis further:  
 
Иван вдруг схватил со стола стакан и с розмаху пустил в оратора. (704) 
 
[Lit: Ivan suddenly grabbed a glass from the table and threw it at the orator.] 
 
This sudden assertion of violence alerts the reader of Ivan’s shame over his past beliefs. 
Unable to restrain himself, he lashes out at the devil in an attempt to silence his former 
words that have now returned to haunt him. Judging by his actions, then, we are lead to 
believe that Ivan has finally overcome his thesis. Confronted with both Smerdyakov’s 
crime and the devil’s visit, he realizes the errors of his ways and commits to change 
through his decision to testify in court.  
 Up until this point, Ivan’s fluctuating beliefs appear in line with Bakhtin’s theory 
of “unfinalizability.” From his constant uncertainty to his eventual renunciation, his 
unresolved search for the truth seems to protect him from Dostoevsky’s despotic words. 
Though true to a degree, this perspective falls flat in view of Bakhtin’s dialogic 
understanding of the idea. “Human thought,” he writes, “becomes genuine thought, that 
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is, an idea, only under conditions of living contact with another and alien thought, a 
thought embodied in someone else’s voice, that is, in someone else’s consciousness 
expressed in dialogue” (Problems 88). In other words, ideas only become valid when 
expressed through speech. Otherwise, they remain limp and impotent, trapped in one’s 
consciousness and consequently excluded from the realm of living interaction. Given this 
definition, then, a character’s “unfinalizability” necessarily depends on her ability to 
speak; without a functioning voice, the character loses her seat at the table and becomes 
subject to the author’s finalizing pen. Yet while Bakhtin justly acknowledges the dialogic 
nature of ideas, he neglects the importance of non-verbal communication. As Caryl 
Emerson maintains, a “genuine interlocutor (of the sort you rarely meet in the literary 
passages Bakhtin selects for his analysis) is always free to walk in on me at inconvenient 
times, walk out on me at will, speak inpenetrable nonsense, ignore me altogether… [or] 
even kill me off” (142). Taking this into consideration, an author can overpower her 
characters by silencing or hindering their speech. In doing so, she shuts them out from the 
realm of ideas and finalizes them according to her own values and beliefs.  
 To examine this process of finalization, one might look no further than Ivan’s 
breakdown and ensuing coma. Over the course of the last two books, Ivan gradually loses 
control of his voice. Though once eloquent and articulate, he begins to stumble and err as 
he is forced to reevaluate his thesis and come to terms with his complicity in Fyodor 
Pavlovich’s death. Thus impaired, he starts to recede from the sphere of ideas as he can 
no longer adequately defend “everything is permitted” through speech alone. Consider, 
for instance, his loss for words following Smerdyakov’s confession:  
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‘Хорошо, хорошо... Обо мне потом. Чего это я все дрожу... Слова не могу 
выговорить.’  (675) 
 
[Lit: ‘All right, all right… about me later. Why do I keep trembling… I can’t get a 
word out.’] 
 
By Bakhtin’s own admission, Ivan’s inability to speak indicates his weakening 
independence. Instead of supporting or clarifying his thesis, he finds himself speechless 
as Smerdyakov accuses him of killing his father. In this way, Dostoevsky muzzles Ivan 
and deprives him of the opportunity to participate in the exchange of ideas. Ivan’s 
testimony at Dmitri’s trial is likewise marred by incomprehensible speech. Failing to 
exonerate his brother, he raves incoherently as he struggles to formulate a lucid thought: 
 
Видите, слушайте меня: я ему сказал: не хочу молчать, а он про 
геологический переворот... глупости… Все равно, что пьяная каналья 
загорланит, как «поехал Ванька в Питер,» а я за две секунды радости отдал 
бы квадрильйон квадрильйонов. (745) 
 
[Lit: ‘You see, listen to me: I told him I would not keep silent, and he started 
telling me about the geological cataclysm… what nonsense… All the same, that 
drunken rascal hollers “Vanka’s gone to Petersburg,” but for two seconds of joy 
I’d give a quadrillion quadrillion.’] 
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To the uninformed ear, Ivan’s testimony amounts to unintelligible nonsense. To the 
reader, on the other hand, his speech reverberates with the words of the devil, both in his 
reference to his article “the geological cataclysm” and the story of Hosanna that the devil 
relates in his nightmare (“I’d give a quadrillion quadrillion seconds for two seconds of 
joy”). By entangling his confession with the devil’s discourse, Dostoevsky effectively 
gags Ivan and attributes his insanity to his struggle with his thesis. Despite his noble 
intentions, his past beliefs continue to torment him and consequently prevent him from 
saving his brother. In this respect, Dostoevsky emphasizes the pervasive damage of 
“everything is permitted,” illustrating the psychological toll it inflicts on Ivan.  
 If Dostoevsky begins to finalize Ivan by undermining his speech, then he 
completes this process with Ivan’s eventual comatose state. “Dostoevsky’s hero is not an 
objectified image but an autonomous discourse, pure voice” (Bakhtin, Problems 53). 
Based on this premise, then, Ivan’s coma essentially stifles his voice and solidifies him 
into an “objectified image.” Both deaf and mute, he loses his connection to the realm of 
ideas and falls prey to Dostoevsky’s subsuming consciousness. Following his collapse at 
the trial, he succumbs to brain fever and falls into a deep, unconscious state:  
 
рядом же, в другой комнате, лежал в горячке и в беспамятстве Иван 
Федорович… Оставшиеся доктора хоть и ободряли Катерину Ивановну и 
Алешу, но видно было, что они не могли еще подать твердой надежды (820) 
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[Lit: nearby, in the other room, lay Ivan Fyodorovich in a fever and 
unconscious… Though the remaining doctors encouraged Katerina Ivanovna and 
Alyosha, it was clear that they still could not give any firm hope.] 
 
By ending Ivan’s story in a coma, Dostoevsky successfully silences him and robs him of 
his final word. Instead of sustaining his consciousness and thus his “unfinalizability,” 
Dostoevsky brings Ivan’s ideological journey to a conclusion, tracing his initial fervor all 
the way to his intellectual and physical demise. If Ivan’s theory was in fact a “theoretical 
game” as Kantor proposes, then Dostoevsky intervenes as the referee, penalizing his 
hero’s behavior and reestablishing order within the novel’s ethical realm. In doing so, he 
asserts his presence into the text and guides the novel to its end in accordance with his 
moral principles.  
 “Self-consciousness,” Bakhtin declares, “as the artistic dominant in the structure 
of a character’s image, presupposes a radically new authorial position with regard to the 
represented person” (Problems 57). Yet in the case of Ivan, Dostoevsky all but oppresses 
his hero, subverting his thesis through discursive filters and ending his narrative in 
silence. To this extent, Dostoevsky’s authorial presence manifests in his condemnation of 
“everything is permitted.” Though he stops short of explicitly criticizing the thesis 
through the narrator, his disapproval resonates in his discursive presentation of the idea 
and tempts the reader to take an allied view. Does Dostoevsky go to great lengths in order 
to represent ideas holistically? Perhaps, but the fact remains that he exploits his position 
as a creator to discursively frame the novel’s events and thereby influence the reader’s 
interpretation. In this respect, Bakhtin’s theory of polyphony fails to account for the 
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inherent advantages the author holds over her characters. Encumbered by the ideological 
weight of language, the author must consider the impact each discourse has on its 
content, a process Dostoevsky embraces rather than resists. Far from existing “alongside” 
his characters, he reigns over The Brothers Karamazov like a monologic creator, 




















Chapter 2: Fact or Fiction: Discursive History in Absalom, Absalom! 
 
“Memory creates the chain of tradition which passes a happening on from generation to 
generation.” (93) 
Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller” 
 
 Beyond its capacity to moralize, literature plays an integral role in our 
understanding of history. From the epic to the novel, the genre enables us to translate 
experience into writing and thus establish continuity between the past and present. Yet far 
from depicting the past accurately, literature invariably complicates our image of history 
due to its basis in language. Instead of preserving the past as it occurred, language 
fragments history into a multitude of discursive perspectives, each imposing it with a 
subjective narrative. Though many authors attempt to conceal this process, perhaps no 
novel reveals this distortive relationship between language and history to the extent of 
William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! (1936). Over the course of the novel, Faulkner’s 
characters take turns relating the legacy of Thomas Sutpen, an impoverished West 
Virginian who moves to Mississippi in pursuit of prosperity and wealth. With each 
narration, Faulkner shatters Sutpen’s past into conflicting interpretations and exposes 
history to be a composite of biased discursive accounts. As one might expect, his 
inconsistent portrayal of Sutpen’s life poses a considerable challenge to Bakhtin’s 
axiological framework. Unlike Dostoevsky’s didactic approach to “everything is 
permitted,” Faulkner turns away from evaluating Sutpen’s legacy and deploys discourses 
in order to complicate our reception of his life instead. This being the case, he pushes 
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Bakhtin’s theories to the brink of their applicability, drawing language into crisis and 
questioning its very capability of faithfully conveying the past.  
 Like The Brothers Karamazov, Absalom, Absalom! bears the appearance of a 
polyphonic text. As opposed to anchoring the novel to a single character or narrator, 
Faulkner organizes the work as a chorus of disparate and autonomous voices. From Miss 
Rosa to Quentin, Mr. Compson to Shreve, the characters express themselves almost 
exclusively through dialogue, occupying the text as “pure voice” rather than “objectified 
image[s]” (Bakhtin, Problems 53). At first glance, Faulkner’s chorus of voices seems to 
abandon a centralized structure in favor of “a plurality of independent and unmerged 
voices and consciousnesses” (Problems 6). Yet as was the case in The Brothers 
Karamazov, Faulkner retains the highest position within the text by voicing ideas through 
his composition of discourses. Just as Dostoevsky condemns “everything is permitted” by 
means of its discursive presentation, Faulkner undermines each character’s narration of 
the past by juxtaposing their respective discourses and thereby betraying the personal 
biases that underlie each. As Stephen M. Ross puts it, Faulkner’s voice functions as an 
“overvoice” within the text, contrasting each account by “taking up into itself all 
subsidiary voices” (221). Crucially, however, Faulkner’s “overvoice” does not offer its 
own interpretation of Sutpen’s life but illustrates the difficulties inherent to preserving the 
past through discourse. Presenting history as an amalgamation of narrative perspectives, 
he draws attention to language’s corruptive potential and encourages us to regard each 
voice with suspicion, regardless of their credibility or lack thereof. 
He accomplishes this in part by treating the novel’s primary characters – Miss 
Rosa, Mr. Compson, Quentin, and Shreve – as intradiegetic narrators. Throughout the 
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text, the characters trade off narratorial responsibility, assuming the role of the speaker 
and relating Sutpen’s legacy in their own unique terms. With each shift in narration, 
Faulkner unhinges the text from one perspective to another in a fluid succession of 
discursive accounts. By keeping the subject of each narration – Sutpen’s legacy –
consistent, he draws our attention away from the content and foregrounds the formal 
elements specific to each narrator instead. Put differently, his emphasis shifts from what 
the characters say to how they say it. Accordingly, his narrators “recommend themselves 
as specific and limited verbal ideological points of view,” distinguishable not by their 
actions but by their discursive orientations (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 313). This being the 
case, narratorial discourse in Absalom, Absalom! can be evaluated on two levels:  
 
one, the level of the narrator, a belief system filled with his objects, meanings and 
emotional expressions, and the other, the level of the author, who speaks (albeit in 
a refracted way) by means of this story and through this story. (Bakhtin, 
“Discourse” 314) 
 
To excavate Faulkner’s authorial presence, then, one must consider each narrator’s 
discursive tendencies and the ways in which they influence, or perhaps more 
appropriately, complicate our understanding of Sutpen’s life. This in turn prompts the 
question: How does each character employ diction and rhetoric to recreate the past? And 
on a broader level, how does each discursive perspective contribute to Faulkner’s 
representation of Sutpen’s life as a whole? 
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Before examining each narrator and his or her specific discourses, it is necessary 
to first address the presence of the text’s nameless extradiegetic narrator. At various 
points in the work, Faulkner deploys this voice in order to provide the story with 
descriptions of the primary characters and their surroundings. Yet far from neutral, this 
narrator becomes increasingly more involved as the story progresses, often interjecting 
with his own thoughts and opinions. Critically, this voice does not stand in for Faulkner 
but functions as yet another discourse at his disposal. Like Dostoevsky’s humble 
provincial narrator, Faulkner’s extradiegetic narrator relates the text’s events through a 
personalized linguistic lens. Though he stops short of providing this narrator with a 
biography or concrete presence within the novel’s universe, he nevertheless employs it in 
order to mediate each character’s narration and thereby guide our reception of Sutpen’s 
legacy as a whole. To this end, the extradiegetic narrator acts as a framing device, the 
effects of which I address at greater length below.  
Leaving this external narrator aside for the time being, the bulk of the narration is 
handled by novel’s four primary storytellers. Faulkner initiates this narratorial hand-off 
with Miss Rosa, Sutpen’s embittered sister-in-law and, for a brief moment in time, fiancé. 
As the only character to have known Sutpen personally, her narration both benefits and 
suffers from its basis in firsthand experience. While her relationship with Sutpen grounds 
her account in reality, her contempt for him compromises her objectivity and betrays her 
efforts to portray him as a villain. Throughout her narration, she casts him as a 
contemptible monster, referring to him an as “ogre” (127), “djinn” (16), and a “beast out 
of a tale” interchangeably (127). More importantly, she often turns to demonology to 
vilify his image, calling him both a “demon” (136) and a “light-blinded bat-like image… 
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cast by the fierce demoniac lantern up from beneath the earth’s crust” (139). Clearly, she 
views her late brother-in-law to be less of a human than an infernal force of evil. Casting 
aside his humanity, she “is both unable and unwilling to acknowledge the object of her 
vengeance as a being a mortal man,” attributing his actions to “strange supernatural 
powers” instead (Levins 37). Through this reductive portrayal of Sutpen, Faulkner 
solidifies Miss Rosa’s narration into an “object of verbal artistic representation” 
(Bakhtin, “Discourse” 332). Limiting her discursive arsenal to demonology and the like, 
he outlines the edges of her ideological perspective and exposes her attempts to 
mythologize Sutpen into a diabolic figure.  
Apart from endowing her with hyperbolic speech, Faulkner also undermines Miss 
Rosa’s account by interposing her narration with conflicting discourses. In addition to her 
demonism, she draws upon the language of the Lost Cause in order to recognize Sutpen’s 
bravery as a soldier, acknowledging him as a “hero” with tremendous “honor and 
strength” (13). Of course, her gallant characterization not only weakens her attempts to 
demonize him but completely contradicts them. Whereas Sutpen-as-demon acts purely in 
the name of evil and destruction, Sutpen-as-hero acts out of honor and principle, risking 
his life on behalf of the South. This contradiction manifests most plainly in what Bakhtin 
calls a “hybrid construction,” where two styles of speech coexist in a single utterance 
(“Discourse” 304). Consider, for example, Miss Rosa’s second narration, where she 
describes Sutpen as “a shape which rode away beneath a flag and (demon or no) 
courageously suffered” (135). In one breath, she paradoxically portrays him as both 
honest and devious, heroic and demonic, good and evil. Unable to reconcile her feelings 
of vitriol and admiration, her discourses clash and consequently open a gap in her speech 
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where her image of Sutpen falls apart. From an authorial point of view, Miss Rosa’s 
discursive failings demonstrate language’s inability to represent the past faithfully. 
Faulkner does not intend to endorse her demonism or valorous diction. Instead, he draws 
attention to her efforts to rewrite the past by means of discourse, prompting the reader to 
examine the deceptive relationship between language and the past.   
Similar to Miss Rosa, Faulkner’s second narrator Mr. Compson refashions 
Sutpen’s past into a legendary tale of inhuman proportions. Notably, he differs from Miss 
Rosa in that he bases his narration in vicarious experience, a characteristic that appears 
most clearly in his appropriation of epic discourse. True to the epic tradition, he projects 
Sutpen as a larger-than-life figure living in a time inaccessible to the present. In his 
words, Sutpen’s era was “simpler” and “more heroic” (71). By that same token, his 
contemporaries were “distinct” and “uncomplex” (71), acting out “of simple passion and 
simple violence, impervious to time and inexplicable” (80). Like Homer’s portrayal of 
Odysseus, Mr. Compson separates himself from Sutpen by an insurmountable temporal 
distance. “The epic world,” Bakhtin writes, “is constructed in the zone of an absolute 
distanced image, beyond the sphere of possible contact with the developing, incomplete 
and therefore re-thinking and re-evaluating present” (“Epic” 17). Crucial here is 
Bakhtin’s emphasis on reassessment. By depicting the past as “devoid of the complexity 
and simplicity of modern life,” Mr. Compson offers Sutpen’s legacy as a completed 
image immune to revision (Rollyson, “Historiography” 87). In this sense, he 
mythologizes Sutpen’s deeds and accomplishments, presenting him as a character out of 
a tale rather than an actual human being.  
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Yet just as Miss Rosa’s narration buckles under her irreconcilable discourses, so 
too does Mr. Compson contradict himself with a second, incompatible approach to the 
past: the discourse of conjecture. Despite his self-imposed epic distance from Sutpen, he 
nonetheless ventures to fill in the gaps of his knowledge through speculation. 
Linguistically, Faulkner foregrounds this approach by means of the phrase “I can 
imagine,” which Mr. Compson deploys ten times in Chapter 4 alone (72, 82, 85, 86, 87, 
88, 96). Along the same lines, Mr. Compson often bifurcates his narration into 
speculative timelines by means of the phrase “or perhaps” (48, 49, 50, 59, 63, 69). In 
describing Bon’s wardrobe, for instance, he pictures him walking across campus “in the 
slightly Frenchified cloak and hat which he wore, or perhaps (I like to think this) … in a 
flowered, almost feminised gown” (76; my emphasis). Here, the phrase “or perhaps” 
opens Mr. Compson’s narrative to conjecture and enables him to overcome the temporal 
distance fabricated by his epic diction. Like Miss Rosa’s heroic vocabulary, then, his 
revisionist discourse subverts his mythologizing and produces a rupture in his discursive 
rendering of history. Crucially, Mr. Compson does not speculate freely but adapts the 
narrative within his own discursive parameters. In other words, he reimagines the past to 
fit his own narratorial predilections (“I like to think this”), in this case conjuring Bon’s 
“feminised gown” to frame the story as a homoerotic drama between Henry and Bon. 
Thus, Faulkner presents historical storytelling as a deeply personal enterprise, one in 
which the storyteller becomes entangled in his own attempts to resurrect the past through 
language.  
A critical difference between Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson lies in the latter’s 
conjectural awareness. In contrast to Miss Rosa, who attempts to conceal her discursive 
Weaver 50 
discrepancies, Mr. Compson comes to recognize his inability to reconstruct the past 
through language alone. In one of the novel’s most reflexive moments, he digresses from 
Sutpen’s legacy to ruminate on the challenges inherent to rebuilding the past:  
 
Yes, Judith, Bon, Henry, Sutpen: all of them. They are there, yet something is 
missing… You re-read, tedious and intent, poring, making sure that you have 
forgotten nothing, made no miscalculation; you bring them together again and 
again nothing happens; just the words, the symbols, the shapes themselves, 
shadowy inscrutable and serene, against that turgid background of a horrible and 
bloody mischancing of human affairs. (80) 
 
In this instance, Mr. Compson’s impulse to speculate borders on despondency; for all his 
efforts to gather and assemble the pieces of the past, he repeatedly bumps up against 
“something… missing,” a crucial detail or event that, unaccounted for, renders the story 
indecipherable. The same can be said of Absalom, Absalom! itself. To quote R. Rio-
Jelliffe, 
 
The coiling of narrators within narrators, creating refractions within refractions in 
almost undecipherable melding, and raising questions on their reliability and on 
the fictive mode itself, is the technical analogue to the novelist's skepticism about 
language which falsifies, and his ability to represent reality or truth. (77) 
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In this sense, Mr. Compson’s meditation holds a mirror up to the text and calls attention 
to the “shadowy” and “inscrutable” features of Faulkner’s discursive composition. Just as 
he struggles to sift through the details of the past, so too does the reader find herself 
submerged in a sea of competing narratives, fighting to stay afloat and make sense of 
Sutpen’s legacy. Through this parallel, Faulkner channels his “skepticism about 
language” through Mr. Compson and invites the reader to take a similarly distrustful 
stance. Language, he intimates, cannot preserve the past; instead, it obscures and distorts 
it, fracturing it into discursive splinters that can never be restored.  
 While Mr. Compson’s rumination echoes Faulkner’s own attitude toward 
language, his reflexivity pales in comparison to Quentin and Shreve’s deconstructive 
approach to the past. Unlike the two elders, who use discourse to recreate Sutpen’s 
legacy, Quentin and Shreve place an equal amount of emphasis on peeling back the 
story’s discursive layers. To this extent, their narrations relate Sutpen’s life not as it 
happened but as it has been told, presenting his legacy as a passed-down story rather than 
historical fact. Though they themselves partake in imposing narratives onto his past, they 
couch these narratives in skepticism and constantly question the credibility of their 
sources. From this perspective, they assume the role of both authors and readers. By 
interpreting Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson’s accounts while simultaneously offering their 
own, their narrations become “a process that self-reflexively depicts the narrative and 
hermeneutic processes of the text itself” (Ross 226). Thus, Quentin and Shreve play a 
pivotal role in enacting Faulkner’s creative enterprise. Beyond depicting Sutpen’s life, 
they show the reader how to approach the past as a composite of subjective narratives by 
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highlighting the shortcomings inherent to language. In doing so, they flood the text with 
discursive awareness and empower the reader to scrutinize history on a linguistic basis.  
  As a narrator, Quentin underscores the formal elements of Sutpen’s tale through 
his use of citational discourse. Throughout his narration, he repeatedly references his 
sources in order to situate himself within a larger tradition of storytelling. As opposed to 
asserting his rendition as factual, he peppers his narrative with citations and thereby 
qualifies his statements as conditional, subjective, and most pertinently, secondhand. He 
employs this technique most liberally in his description of Sutpen’s hunt for the architect, 
which he relates according to “how Grandfather remembered it” (198). Over and again, 
he pauses his narration to acknowledge its origins, inserting the phrase “So he [Sutpen] 
told Grandfather” five times into his telling (178, 180, 184, 195, 200). With each 
deployment of this phrase, he provides the story’s paper trail and traces its chain of 
storytellers from his father to his Grandfather to Sutpen himself. “Quentin, no matter how 
far his mind wanders from the dialogue with others, is placed in a social and historical 
reality rather than being sanctioned off to pursue wholly private fantasies” (Rollyson, 
“Historiography” 80). Indeed, his story not only acknowledges his socio-historical 
position but incorporates it into its very composition. Weaving his sources into his 
narrative, Quentin offers Sutpen’s legacy in all its discursive coatings and presents it as a 
multi-treated account of the past. By virtue of this citational emphasis, Faulkner shifts the 
focus from the story’s content to its form, holding magnifying glass over the discursive 
cracks in Sutpen’s past.  
 From a formalist perspective, Faulkner establishes Quentin’s citational discourse 
by means of parenthetical clauses. Instead of seamlessly integrating his references into 
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his narration, Faulkner breaks the flow of the text to insert his asides, slowing the 
reader’s eye in order to spotlight each citation. In a description of Sutpen’s childhood, for 
example, Faulkner interrupts the telling twice to include Quentin’s sources:  
 
he just thought that some people were spawned in one place and some in 
another… and that (so he told Grandfather) the men themselves had little to do 
with the choosing and less of the regret (he told Grandfather this too) (180; my 
emphasis) 
 
Needless to say, Faulkner’s parenthetical clauses foreground the narration’s structural 
features and diverts the reader’s attention from content to form. Far from the exception, 
Faulkner saturates Quentin’s account with similar interjectory clauses and makes them a 
defining feature of his narratorial style, inserting his father and grandfather nine times in 
Chapter 7 alone (203, 206, 215-6, 218, 221, 226-8). In this respect, Quentin’s narration 
visually exposes the discursive influence of his elders. Through these constant 
invocations, Faulkner reveals his account to be a product of multiple retellings and 
reminds the reader to regard each narration with distrust.   
 Similar to Quentin, Shreve builds his narration around citationality and often 
stops to identify his sources. When compared with his roommate, however, Shreve’s 
citational discourse comes across as far more critical. As the furthest removed from 
Sutpen’s legacy, he approaches the story as an outsider and challenges the other 
narrators, calling their reliability into question.   On several occasions he considers 
Sutpen’s past in conjunction with Mr. Compson’s accuracy, making evaluative remarks 
Weaver 54 
such as “maybe this was the one place where your old man was right” (273) and “your 
old man was wrong here, too!” (275). Likewise, he interjects during Quentin’s narration 
to point out inconsistencies between accounts. One example of this occurs during 
Quentin’s description of Sutpen’s grand design, where Shreve asks him to clarify the 
temporal discrepancies between accounts: “Your old man… When your grandfather was 
telling this to him, he didn’t know any more what your grandfather was talking about 
than your grandfather knew what the demon was talking about when the demon told it to 
him, did he?” (220). In posing this question, Shreve assuming the role of the reader as he 
attempts to disentangle Quentin’s knotted sources. Significantly, his question not only 
indicates his activity as a listener but as an active participant within the context of 
Sutpen’s oral history. “To truly know the meaning of the Sutpen story Shreve feels he 
must discover it for himself: he has mocked and questioned the previous versions, and 
soon he must offer his own interpretation of the past” (Rollyson, “Recreation” 41). His 
constant doubts, then, reflect his own approach to history. Though he regards the Sutpen 
story with suspicion, he nevertheless feels compelled to partake in its ongoing formation.  
 Shreve’s participation in the Sutpen oral tradition manifests most clearly in his 
adoption of Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson’s discourses. In his own narration, he refers to 
Sutpen as a “Faustus” and “demon,” drawing on the same demonology that pervades 
Miss Rosa’s speech. In the same vein, he embraces Mr. Compson’s epic discourse in his 
description of Miss Rosa’s move to Sutpen’s estate, where he invokes both Homer and 
Ovid: “she wouldn’t have had to go out there and be betrayed by the old meat and find 
instead of a widowed Agamemnon to her Cassandra an ancient stiff-jointed Pyramus to 
her eager though untried Thisbe” (144). Shreve’s appropriation of discourses calls to 
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mind Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller,” in which he describes oral tradition as a 
“slow piling on top of the other of thin, transparent layers” (93). In this case, each “layer” 
represents the influence of a previous narrator. No longer exclusive to a single storyteller, 
Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson’s discursive perspectives become ingrained into the story 
itself, a feature Shreve reserves the right to question but ultimately cannot escape. In this 
regard, Faulkner uses Shreve’s narration to trace the progression of each discourse, from 
its initial conception to its reincorporation. Regardless of whether or not Shreve agrees 
with the elders, their discourses account for his only available material. This being the 
case, they find their way into his narration and consequently sink their roots deeper into 
the Sutpen story.  
 Although Shreve integrates the elder’s words into his own rendition, he also 
resists their influence by means of irony. Coming from his lips, their discourses come 
across as unfounded and hyperbolic, grounded in personal biases rather than historical 
fact. He accomplishes this in part by overembellishing their diction. Take, for instance, 
his excessive demonization of Sutpen: “this Faustus, this demon, this Beelzebub fled 
hiding from some momentary flashy glare of his Creditor’s outraged face” (145). Unlike 
Miss Rosa, whose demonizing stems from firsthand experience and therefore genuine 
contempt, his diabolic portrayal of Sutpen is based entirely in the spinster’s embittered 
account. For this reason, his words lack authenticity and strike the reader as hollow and 
insincere. Similarly, he regularly interrupts Quentin’s narration in order to rebrand 
Sutpen as “The demon” (181, 198, 214, 217). “Shreve’s references…” Rollyson argues, 
“ridicule Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson’s tendency to distort the Sutpen story into Gothic 
legend or Greek myth” (“Recreation” 39). Yet more than that, his interjections illustrate 
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Miss Rosa’s own attempts to impose demonic diction onto the past. Instead of allowing 
the discourse to arise organically, he takes it upon himself to intervene and graft 
demonology onto the story. His attention, in other words, shifts from the content of the 
story to the process of storytelling itself. But as Faulkner no doubt intends to show, this 
distinction between content and form no longer exists. As each narrator takes turns 
handling Sutpen’s past, their discourses sink into the story and irrevocably change its 
content. Thus, for Quentin and Shreve, Sutpen’s legacy transforms into a story about 
storytelling, where each narrator acts a character alongside Sutpen himself.  
While both Quentin and Shreve facilitate this shift in the story’s focus, their 
efforts are heavily bolstered by none other than the extradiegetic narrator. Despite his 
relative inactivity in the first half of the novel, he becomes increasingly vocal as Quentin 
and Shreve step up to the plate and turn the Sutpen story into their own. Crucially, this 
nameless narrator differs from the young men in that he turns away from Sutpen’s legacy 
to describe the other characters insofar as they act as narrators. That is to say, he 
provides a lens onto the process of storytelling itself, commenting on each narrator’s 
account and thereby guiding our interpretation of the accumulating tale. “The Omniscient 
narrator…” Rio-Jelliffe suggests, “institutes most ideas on the creative process and on 
fiction, and embodies them in form and style” (84). In this respect, the extradiegetic 
narrator comes closest to expressing Faulkner’s attitude toward history. Though he by no 
means stands in for authorial word, his voice enables Faulkner to frame each narrator’s 
approach to the past and thus mediate our reception of storytelling as a historical practice.  
Above all, the extradiegetic narrator portrays storytelling as a deeply imaginative 
process. Whereas the secondary narrators discreetly blend speculation into their stories, 
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he makes a point to stress the conjectural aspects of their accounts. In some instances, 
these remarks seem to validate the characters’ guesswork. He considers Shreve’s 
description of Sutpen’s drawing room “invented” yet “true enough” and later 
acknowledges a depiction of Bon to be “likewise true” (268). At other points, however, 
his tone appears more skeptical, such as when he points out Quentin and Shreve’s 
attempts to manipulate the tale according to what “fit the preconceived” (253) or when he 
notes their creation of “people who perhaps had never existed at all” (243). Through 
these remarks, Faulkner constructs an interpretive scaffolding that informs our reading of 
the storytelling process. As opposed to immersing us in each account, he inserts the 
omniscient voice to retrieve us from the inner frame and redirect our attention to the 
narrators themselves. Thus, when we plunge back into the story’s sea of discourses, we 
become more perceptive to the creative liberties taken by each individual narrator. Less 
human beings than linguistic constructs, Sutpen and his contemporaries begin to 
disappear as they cease to be living people and are transformed into characters 
discursively shaped by each storyteller.   
Importantly, the extradiegetic narrator reveals storytelling to be not only 
imaginative but vicarious as well. Beyond reconstructing the past, each narrator ventures 
to live through their renditions by treating Sutpen’s story as an escape rather than a 
historical account. In order to highlight this feature, the extradiegetic narrator blurs the 
lines between the intradiegetic narrators and their subjects, most notably between 
Quentin, Shreve, Bon, and Henry. Collapsing both physical and temporal boundaries, he 
describes “not two of them there and then either but four of them riding the two horses” 
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in reference to the four young men (237). As the novel progresses, this overlap persists 
and even begins to proliferate:  
 
They were both in Carolina and the time was forty-six years ago, and it was not 
even four now but compounded still further, since now both of them were Henry 
Sutpen and both of them were Bon, compounded each of both yet either neither. 
(280) 
 
Through its various retellings, the Sutpen story expands into a multi-layered tale 
populated by both its subjects and vicarious tellers. Of course, the narrators do not project 
themselves into the past or even merge the past with the present. Instead, they seize 
Sutpen’s legacy and use it to springboard their fantasies, which while based in the past 
find a unique existence in the present. Drawing this to the forefront, the extradiegetic 
narrator depicts storytelling as a profoundly personal enterprise. Caught up in their own 
web of discourses, the narrators invest themselves into their stories not only to examine 
the past but to make-believe and reflect, to participate in a communal historical process 
and thus have a hand in shaping the world around them.  
 For all the winding narrations in Absalom, Absalom!, there remains one instance 
of unmediated authorial discourse that must be taken into consideration: the title. 
Attributable only to Faulkner himself, the title offers an initial interpretative lens that 
precedes the narrative and tempers our expectations as readers going into the text. As 
many have been quick to point out, Faulkner lifts the title from David’s famous lament in 
the Second Book of Samuel, where the king grieves over the death of his son Absalom: 
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“O my son Absalom, O Absalom, my son, my son!” (The Holy Bible, II Samuel 19:4). 
Critics have linked this moment to Faulkner’s novel in a number of different ways. “The 
parallel here to the Sutpen story,” Ralph Behrens claims, “lies in the rebellion of Henry 
against his father. Though Henry is not killed, as Absalom was, he is, for all practical 
purposes, dead to his father” (31). Others have drawn a connection to Bon’s desire to be 
acknowledged by his father, identifying the phrase “my son,” which Faulkner 
deliberately omits from the title, as the same words Bon so desperately wishes to hear 
Sutpen say. So does Faulkner offer this biblical perspective as his own preferred 
approach to the text? Perhaps, yet given the narrative’s emphasis on perspectivism, it is 
more likely yet another discursive layer Faulkner piles on top of the past in order to 
distort it further. The novel’s “constant circling around so-called facts and events, for a 
point of vantage but never settling for the exclusivity of one’s own vision, ensures that 
interpretation is an unending process” (Rollyson, “Historiography” 94). In this sense, the 
title serves as one of many privileged perspectives, no more definitive than any other 
interpretation of Sutpen’s past.  
 When compared to The Brothers Karamazov, Absalom, Absalom! confronts 
Bakhtinian authorial presence with far greater resistance. As opposed to taking a concrete 
position, as Dostoevsky seems to do in his condemnation of Ivan’s thesis, Faulkner 
avoids taking a definitive stance to Sutpen’s legacy, challenging oral storytelling as a 
discursive practice instead. From Miss Rosa’s demonology to Mr. Compson’s epic 
diction, he exposes oral history to be pure discourse, where language no longer permits 
access to the real but distorts our understanding of the past. From this perspective, his 
textual presence manifests in the questions he attempts to provoke in the reader. How 
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does language hinder our understanding of the past? And how can we separate history 
from its years of discursive treatment? To these questions, he leaves no conclusive 
answers, offering Absalom, Absalom! as a space to reflect on the distortive relationship 

































Chapter 3: Authoring and Permissibility: Discursive Deception in Lolita 
 
 
“Literature is not innocent. It is guilty and should admit itself so.” (11) 
Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil 
 
 For many, literature plays an integral role in shaping our ethics. From sacred texts 
to didactic fables, the aesthetic activity has longstanding roots in a tradition of imparting 
moral lessons and thus informing our ethical standards. For this reason, we expect each 
text to contain a central ethical problem as well as a stance clearly voiced by the author. 
This expectation is perhaps why Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) has both frustrated 
and enthralled readers since its publication. Throughout the text, Humbert Humbert 
repeatedly rapes and abuses his stepdaughter Dolores Haze, holding her captive as he 
smuggles her from state to state. Yet despite Humbert’s abhorrent behavior, Nabokov 
effectively obscures his actions by entrusting him with the novel’s narratorial 
responsibilities. As eloquent as he is deceptive, Humbert exploits his role as the narrator 
by discursively manipulating our reception of his conduct and thereby romanticizing his 
relationship with Dolores. Nabokov, for his part, alleges to neither condemn nor condone 
Humbert’s actions, instead claiming to pursue moments of “aesthetic bliss” (Lolita 315). 
Of course, Nabokov’s self-professed aversion to moralizing poses a significant problem 
to Bakhtin’s axiological approach to authorial presence. If an author’s textual presence 
manifests in her discursive presentation of content, how can this position be articulated in 
the absence of an ethical stance? And more importantly, what are the moral implications 
of such an approach to authorship, where ethics fall to the wayside and everything is 
permissible?  
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 In the afterword to Lolita, Nabokov adamantly denies any moral lesson to be 
found in the novel. As opposed to denouncing his protagonist, as Dostoevsky does to 
Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov, he claims to turn away from moralizing altogether, 
dismissing “didactic fiction” as “topical trash” (315). As he goes on to argue:  
 
Lolita has no moral in tow. For me a work of fiction exists only insofar as it 
affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic bliss, that is a sense of being 
somehow, somewhere, connected with other states of being where art (curiosity, 
tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm. (315) 
 
Needless to say, his formulation of “aesthetic bliss” should be met with skepticism. In the 
first place, he complicates his aesthetic position by including “kindness” into its 
definition, a quality that leaves the door open for ethical judgement. This qualification 
becomes even more questionable when considered in light of the novel’s content; after 
all, some might argue that the virtues of “tenderness” and “kindness” lie outside of 
Humbert’s grasp altogether. Yet even leaving this contradiction aside, Nabokov’s 
attempts to escape the ethical problems in Lolita leaves the reader in a precarious place. 
Faced with Humbert’s seductive prose and the absence of authorial condemnation, the 
reader takes on the entire burden of the novel’s ethical dilemma, a position in which the 
reader cannot claim innocence to both the content and the style in which it is expressed. 
Still, the question remains: Does Nabokov succeed in evading ethical judgement in 
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Lolita? And if so, how does this affect his textual presence with respect to Bakhtin’s 
framework?3  
 It is my contention that Nabokov does not ignore the question of ethics in Lolita 
but shifts the problem from the work’s content to the act of reading itself. By dressing 
Humbert’s abuse in expressive and enthralling prose, he creates a tension between the 
novel’s content and form that shakes his readers out of passivity and compels them to 
assume ethical responsibility of their own. To quote Julian Connolly,  
 
It should be self-evident that child abuse is evil, but the author would like us to be 
alert to all the ways in which the human spirit can be manipulated, controlled, and 
crushed. The human capacity for language is a miracle, but it can be used to 
manipulate and dominate as well as to entertain and to edify. Nabokov would 
have had no trouble in depicting a pedophile as a foul creature from whom we 
would all recoil at first sight, but that would not present a very interesting 
challenge to him as a writer. (Reader’s Guide 49) 
 
Thus, the act of reading Lolita is not simply an ethical indictment of Humbert’s actions 
but a grapple with the distortive capabilities of language itself. In order to catch a glimpse 
of Humbert’s abuse, the reader must continually combat his discursive manipulation and 
resist his attempts to aesthetically seduce him or her into complicity. From this 
perspective, Nabokov’s pursuit of “aesthetic bliss” takes on a radically new meaning. Our 
                                                        
3 Despite his claims in the afterword that Lolita holds no moral value, Nabokov has stated elsewhere that 
the novel contains a “very moral moral” (Think, Write, Speak 300) and that “Lolita is an indictment of all 
the things it expresses” (ibid. 255). All the same, this chapter will consider his textual presence without 
consulting extratextual sources.  
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pleasure in reading the novel is not simply Nabokov’s lyrical prose, nor is it our ethical 
evaluation of Humbert’s actions. Rather, it is the byproduct of our struggle with the text, 
our constant efforts to peel back its discursive layers without falling prey to Humbert’s 
enchanting style.  
Even so, by deferring ethical judgement to his readers, Nabokov runs the risk of 
romanticizing Humbert’s actions and leaves his authorial intentions up to a wide array of 
interpretations. Though Humbert’s pedophilia may lack ethical ambiguity for some, 
others have lauded the novel as a moving romance, one critic even going as far as calling 
Humbert “The Last Lover” (Trilling 9). Certainly from a Bakhtinian perspective, 
Nabokov’s mesmerizing prose seems to present Humbert’s actions in a positive, if not 
idealized, light. As mentioned in the Introduction, Bakhtin understands form to be “the 
expression of the active, axiological relationship of the author-creator… to content” 
(“Supplement” 306). In other words, form allows the author to convey her attitude toward 
her subject matter via language, a process in which she uses discourse to influence our 
reception of the novel’s content. Within this framework, then, Nabokov’s concession of 
narratorial duties to his devious protagonist seems to imply an attitude of support – or at 
the very least tolerance – with respect to Humbert’s conduct. Upon further inspection, 
however, Bakhtin’s theories reveal Nabokov’s presentation of Humbert’s actions to be a 
far more complex story. Despite Humbert’s seemingly tight grip on the narrative, 
Nabokov disrupts his control by means of conflicting discourses and metafictional 
devices. In both cases, he undermines Humbert’s authority over the text and provides us 
with an escape from his sway, allowing us to momentarily stand outside his subsuming 
consciousness and remember our ethical responsibility as readers.  
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For Bakhtin, an axiological evaluation of a hero and his actions presupposes a 
stable position external to the hero’s consciousness. “[I]t is only the position of being 
situated outside the hero,” he insists, “that enables the author to produce the aesthetic 
value of the hero’s exterior: the spatial form of the hero expresses the author’s 
relationship to the hero” (“Supplement” 96). Without an external image of the hero, he 
argues, it becomes impossible to perceive the border between the author and protagonist. 
As a consequence, the narrative unravels solely from the perspective of the hero-as-self 
and causes the reader to co-experience with the narrator instead of co-create with the 
author. While Bakhtin is shrewd to highlight first-person narration as an obstacle to 
determining authorial intent, his theory overemphasizes the importance of the body and 
ignores the metafictional devices that allow an author to signal her textual presence. 
Through techniques such as breaking the fourth wall, the author calls attention to the 
work’s artificiality and thereby upends the narrator’s control over the text. Far from 
solipsizing her readers, then, the author breaks their immersion and affords them the 
space to look upon the hero insofar as he or she exists as a fictional character separate 
from the author’s voice.  
In the case of Lolita, Nabokov inserts himself into the text under the guise of 
metafictional characters. Although these characters exist in Humbert’s spatiotemporal 
plane, they embody features go beyond the scope of the novel’s fictional universe and 
point back to Nabokov as the work’s creator. Many readers have noticed, for example, 
that the recurring character Vivian Darkbloom forms an anagram of Nabokov’s full name 
(4, 31, 221). While this detail flies over the head of both Humbert and his editor John Ray 
Jr., it strikes the perceptive reader as an intervention by Nabokov himself. A similar case 
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can be made for Humbert’s fatalistic demon “Aubrey McFate” (56). At a number of 
points in the text, Humbert attributes his misfortune to destiny, lamenting over “McFate’s 
way” (211) and “the mind of McFate” (107). Although he uses fate to divest himself of 
responsibility, he unknowingly invokes the true architect behind his actions: Nabokov. 
With each reference to Humbert’s devil, Nabokov places his thumb on the scale and 
reminds the reader of the text’s fictionality. Importantly, he does this not as a means of 
exonerating Humbert but to prevent the reader from wholly succumbing to Humbert’s 
influence. In this sense, Nabokov’s metafictional characters function as a momentary 
respite from Humbert’s perspective that alert the reader to the dangers associated with 
contemplating verbal art. Let down your guard, he seems to suggest, and you risk 
becoming complacent with Humbert’s nefarious behavior.   
In addition to separating his presence from Humbert’s, Nabokov also employs 
metafictional devices to demarcate the reader-hero boundary. Over the course of the 
novel, Humbert regularly addresses his audience, referring to them as “learned readers” 
(133) and “ladies and gentlemen of the jury” (9) interchangeably. Beyond simply 
acknowledging their presence, he even goes as far as describing the reader’s physical 
appearance. He predicts their facial reactions (48, 166) and pictures them reading his 
confession “as a blond-bearded scholar with rosy lips sucking la pomme de sa canne” 
(226). By outlining the reader’s external image, Nabokov negatively defines Humbert’s 
spatial appearance and offers an escape from his immersive consciousness. Rather than 
having us co-experience with Humbert, he foregrounds his textual existence and prompts 
us to remember our responsibilities as readers, not the least of which being our ethical 
examination of the text. This strategy reaches metafictional heights toward the end of Part 
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I, where Humbert entreats his audience to envision him. “Imagine me,” he implores, “I 
shall not exist if you do not imagine me” (129). Here, Humbert’s request not only 
reinforces his fictional existence but calls attention to our creative activity as readers. Far 
from passive, we engage in a constant procedure of analyzing the text’s form in order to 
uncover the content buried beneath. This being the case, Humbert’s plea disrupts our 
complacency and reminds us of our active role as readers, in which we not only receive 
the author’s words but re-assemble them in a process of aesthetic and ethical scrutiny.  
While Nabokov’s metafictional techniques supply us with the space necessary to 
step outside of Humbert’s mind and remember our duties as readers, they stop short of 
encouraging us to condemn Humbert’s actions. Furthermore, many critics have 
interpreted these devices to be yet another strategy employed by Humbert in an effort to 
manipulate his readers. As Michael Federspiel contends, Nabokov’s metafictional ploys 
“regularly serve as attention diverters during problematic scenes,” leading us away from 
Humbert’s abuse and preoccupying us with linguistic games (177). By that same token, 
Nomi Tamir-Ghez explains Humbert’s fourth wall breaks to be similar method of 
deception: 
 
Humbert sometimes addresses his words to a jury or to a judge and sometimes to 
a reader. He thereby implies the coexistence of two different and inconsistent 




By tactically switching between these registers, she maintains, Humbert changes his 
relation to his readers in order to shape their reactions and mitigate their judgement. With 
this in mind, then, Nabokov’s metafictional devices both liberate his readers as well as 
draw them deeper into Humbert’s deceit. Though he provides an escape from Humbert’s 
consciousness, he immediately springs another trap and tempts them back in, thereby 
impeding any attempt to make an ethical evaluation of Humbert’s behavior. Leaving us in 
this momentary state of suspension, Nabokov gives us an opportunity to account for the 
artificiality of the text without losing sight of the ethical responsibilities involved in 
contemplating a fictional work.  
 In a broader sense, Nabokov foregrounds Lolita’s fictionality through his parody 
of literary genres. Drawing upon various traditions, he appropriates their discourses in 
order to subvert their conventions and toy with the reader’s expectations. At the 
beginning of the novel, he draws upon the genre of Realism by including a foreword 
penned by John Ray, Jr., a fictitious PhD who claims to be the editor of Humbert’s 
manuscript. Informing us that the author died on “November 16, 1952” and entrusted his 
writing to his lawyer “Clarence Choate Clark, Esq.,” Ray sets about contextualizing the 
memoir’s existence in order to ground the novel’s events in reality (3). He explains the 
various name changes meant to preserve anonymity and even directs the reader to 
specific “daily papers” for further information detailing Humbert’s crime (4). Yet despite 
Ray’s meticulous setup, Nabokov undercuts his efforts through a series of metafictional 
tactics. An example of this appears in Ray’s mention of the psychologist “Dr. Blanche 
Schwarzmann” (5), a play on the French and German words for ‘white’ and ‘black’ 
respectively (cf. Appel’s annotation, 324). Whereas Ray invokes this name in earnest, 
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Nabokov incorporates this pun in order to poke fun at the black-and-white thinking that 
underlies psychology. Along the same lines, Ray makes a reference slightly earlier on to 
the author “Vivian Darkbloom,” whose presence points back to Nabokov and thus 
shatters the foreword’s realist façade (4). In both cases, Nabokov undermines realist 
practices by reinforcing the text’s artificiality. For all Ray’s efforts to endow the novel’s 
content with real-life consequences, Nabokov overrides his authority and downplays 
Humbert’s actions by emphasizing his fictionality.  
 Nabokov’s subversion of Realism becomes particularly problematic in light of 
Ray’s attempts to encourage a moral reading of the text. At the conclusion of the 
foreword, he alludes to the “potential evils” of the novel, warning: “‘Lolita’ should make 
all of us– parents, social workers, educators– apply ourselves with still greater vigilance 
and vision to the task of bringing up a better generation in a safer world” (6). Taken at 
face value, his caution functions as an initial interpretive lens, one that urges the reader to 
consider the novel from ethical perspective and judge Humbert on the basis of his 
behavior. Yet when considered in relation to Nabokov’s metafiction, Ray’s instruction 
comes across as overly severe and loses its legitimacy as an approach to the text. To 
complicate matters further, Ray qualifies his recommendation by lauding Humbert’s 
writing as “a work of art” that “transcends its expiatory aspects” (5). Though he spends a 
paragraph rebuking Humbert as a “horrible” deviant who serves as a “shining example of 
moral leprosy,” he diminishes these claims by ending the paragraph with praise for 
Humbert’s prose: “But how magically his singing violin can conjure up a tendresse, a 
compassion for Lolita that makes us entranced with the book while abhorring its author!” 
(5). Ray’s contradictory attitudes toward Humbert directly embodies the novel’s tension 
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between content and form. Unable to reconcile Humbert-as-artist and Humbert-as-
deviant, he muddles his ethical message as he struggles to overcome the aesthetic value 
of the text. By introducing the novel with these incompatible perspectives, Nabokov 
thrusts the reader into a position of uncertainty. Neither endorsing Ray’s aesthetic nor 
ethical approach, he offers the text as a problem that must be solved by the reader alone, 
unaided by an authorial point of view.  
 In addition to Realism, Nabokov also taps the tradition of Mystery and Suspense. 
Mining the genre for its conventions and tropes, he structures the text in the style of a 
whodunnit murder-mystery, slowly and strategically unraveling the details to Humbert’s 
crime. From the onset, the reader learns that Humbert was a murderer (9) who wrote his 
manuscript and “died in legal captivity” (3). With this initial setup, Nabokov primes the 
reader for a literary puzzle; the emphasis, in other words, shifts from an ethical 
indictment of Humbert to a hunt for the truth behind his incarceration. Importantly, this 
search for evidence finds its basis in form rather than content. Unlike a detective, who 
solves a mystery in the name of justice, the reader participates in pursuit of the 
satisfaction derived from locating and assembling linguistic clues. The object, then, lies 
not in the formation of a judgement but in the prospect of working out Humbert’s crime 
prior to its reveal. In participating in this game, “we slowly become immune to the topic 
of sex, while getting engrossed in the rules and activities prevailing in this new sphere of 
created numbness” (Federspiel 179). As Federspiel perceptively point outs, Nabokov’s 
linguistic puzzle sedates the reader’s ethical inclinations and transforms Humbert’s 
misdeeds into an entertaining challenge. Held at the level of language, we grow numb to 
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the moral implications of Humbert’s actions as we sift through the text on the lookout for 
clues.  
 True to the mystery genre, Nabokov organizes Lolita as a hypertext in an effort to 
disrupt the forward trajectory of content. Through his calculated placement of clues, he 
encourages a non-linear approach to the text in which the reader backtracks, skims, and 
skips ahead. He fuels this desire in part by making Humbert’s victim, Clare Quilty, a 
minor character up until their final encounter. For many readers, Quilty’s death comes as 
a surprise and sends them back to the start in search of overlooked clues. Humbert 
implicitly issues this challenge himself near the end of the novel, where he describes 
Quilty as the suspect “the astute reader had guessed long ago” (270). His provocation is 
not without reason. Indeed, many of Nabokov’s breadcrumbs only become 
comprehensible on a second reading with the knowledge of Quilty’s identity. The 
murdered playwright first appears in Humbert’s issue of “Who’s Who in the Limelight,” 
which lists the him as the author of “The Little Nymph,” an allusion to Humbert’s 
obsession with nymphets (31). Humbert even comes close to divulging the secret a page 
later, where he makes the rhyme: “Guilty of killing Quilty” (32). While these hints are 
likely planted by Humbert, Nabokov also includes moments that elude Humbert’s 
understanding, such as when Mona Dahl embeds Quilty’s name as “Qu’il t’y” in her 
letter to Dolores (223). Although Humbert senses “an element of mysterious nastiness” in 
the letter, he ultimately overlooks this detail and fails to decode Mona’s message (223). 
By virtue of these hidden clues, Nabokov arranges the novel to incentivize multiple 
readings. Sending the reader back for missing leads, he turns the text into an elaborate 
game that forsakes causality and thus distracts the reader from the work’s content.  
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 In both his appropriation of Realism and Mystery and Suspense, Nabokov 
emphasizes Lolita’s intertextuality with the intention of foregrounding the novel’s formal 
features. In alluding to established literary traditions, he calls attention to the text’s 
stylistic influences and invites the reader to examine the novel in relation to other works 
of fiction. As one might expect, these references pose a significant hurdle to any reader 
bent on ethically judging Humbert’s conduct. With each literary discourse, Nabokov 
leads the reader away from the novel’s content and consequently conceals Humbert’s 
actions behind a wall of prose. In his own explanation of this process, Bakhtin even goes 
as far as to suggest a near complete dissociation between content and form:  
 
Artistic form does not come together here with content in all its cognitive and 
ethical weightiness face to face, as it were. Rather, one work of literature comes 
together with another, which it imitates or which it ‘makes strange,’ and against 
the background of which it is perceived as something new. Here form becomes 
indifferent to content in its immediate, extra-aesthetic validity. (“Supplement” 
284) 
 
Though he is insightful to identify intertextuality as a tension between content and form, 
his theory neglects to account for the metafictional effects engendered by literary 
allusions. As was the case with Nabokov’s self-referential characters, his intertextual 
references enable the reader to slip free from Humbert’s consciousness and recall the 
ethical duties implicit to reading a fictional work. Crucially, however, Nabokov does not 
push his readers to take an ethical stance but leaves them responsible for making this 
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decision themselves. Given the space to recover their ethical awareness yet lacking the 
explicit authorial guidance to do so, the reader must independently decide whether to 
judge Humbert’s actions or interpret the text on a purely aesthetic basis.  
 While Nabokov’s presence manifests most plainly in his metafictional devices, 
his influence can also be discerned in his ironic handling of Humbert’s justifications. In 
the same way that Faulkner undermines Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson’s depiction of the 
past through their conflicting discourses, Nabokov exposes Humbert’s attempts to 
misrepresent his behavior by calling attention to the cracks in his discursive arguments. 
Among Humbert’s favorite discourses to misappropriate includes demonology. Not 
unlike Miss Rosa, who draws upon the discourse to demonize Sutpen, Humbert employs 
demonic diction in reference to certain pubescent girls whom he categorizes as 
“nymphets” (16). Nymphets, he explains, are “demoniac” (16) children with “fantastic 
power” and “insidious charm” (17). For “certain bewitched travelers” – himself included 
– these girls hold the capacity to spellbind and entrance, luring their victims like sirens to 
their demise (16). Humbert’s demonology takes on even greater significance with respect 
to Dolores, who he describes as an “immortal daemon” (139) that emanates “nymphean 
evil” (125). Despite his advantages in age, strength, and experience, he insists that she 
wields power over him and therefore holds the upper hand in their relationship. Clearly, 
Humbert’s demonic discourse does not accurately portray his twelve-year-old 
stepdaughter but distorts her into a diabolic force of evil. By presenting Dolores as a 
demon, he inverts the power dynamic of their relationship and casts himself as a helpless 
victim, all in effort to garner the reader’s sympathy.  
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 Although Humbert invokes demonism in earnest, his other applications of the 
discourse weaken his defense by inadvertently invoking Nabokov. Beyond demonizing 
otherwise powerless girls, Humbert deploys the discourse as a form of fatalism meant to 
free himself of culpability. Instead of taking responsibility for his actions, he claims to be 
at the mercy of the “devil’s inventiveness” (55) and self-identifies as the devil’s 
“plaything” (56). Similarly, he likens his pedophilia to infernal power, referring to his 
feelings of lust as “demons of desire” (264). In each of these examples, Humbert presents 
his behavior as predestined and therefore outside his control. He cannot be held 
accountable, he persists, as he has no free will and only acts under the influence of the 
devil. He is, in a sense, correct. As I noted above, Nabokov inserts himself into the text in 
the form of Aubrey McFate, Humbert’s fatalistic demon and constant adversary. Thus, by 
pinning his actions on the devil, Humbert unwittingly acknowledges his creator and calls 
attention to his existence as a fictional character shaped by discourse. With this 
knowledge in mind, the reader becomes more perceptive to Humbert’s own attempts to 
discursively construct Dolores. Just as Nabokov creates Humbert by means of language, 
so too does Humbert linguistically form Dolores, refracting her image through discursive 
lenses. In this sense, Humbert’s demonology reminds us that his representation of her is a 
fictional construct, a manipulated image distinct from reality.  
 Aside from demonism, Humbert also rationalizes his pedophilia through the use 
of psychological discourse. His argument here hinges upon madness: his attraction to 
young girls originates not from himself but from his mental illness, a psychotic desire 
engendered by his “tortured past” (40). He even goes as far as to assert insanity as a 
prerequisite to discerning nymphets, stressing that one must be a “madman” and 
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“creature of infinite melancholy” in order to distinguish them from other girls (17). Apart 
from these descriptions, he also rebrands his perversion as a medical condition known as 
nympholepsy (cf. Appel’s annotation, 339) and associates himself with other 
“nympholepts” (17). As the plurality of the term suggests, he suffers from “a known and 
recognized disease” of which “he is not the only case,” an argument that seeks legitimacy 
in both awareness and numbers (Tamir-Ghez 28). Simply put, psychological discourse 
enables Humbert to write off his actions as a consequence of his mental ailment. No 
longer the predator, he portrays himself as a victim and entreats the reader to look upon 
him with pity and understanding. In doing so, he minimizes the severity of his 
pedophiliac impulses and mitigates any potential ethical judgement made by reader.    
Whether or not we are convinced by Humbert’s sickness, Nabokov leaves enough 
hints to suggest that we should take his justifications with a grain of salt. Throughout the 
text, Humbert ridicules the practices of modern psychology, deriding the 
“pseudoliberations of pseudolibidoes” based in psychoanalytic theory. He gloats over his 
ability to manipulate psychiatrists (34), mocks principles of the subconscious (167), and 
dismisses child therapy as “regurgitated neo-Freudian hash” (124). Needless to say, 
Humbert’s contempt for psychology flies in the face of his previous arguments predicated 
on mental illness. Through this contradiction, then, Nabokov spotlights Humbert’s 
insincerity in order to unveil his attempts to influence the reader by means of discourse. 
In addition to Humbert’s hypocrisy, Nabokov also satirizes psychology in ways that go 
over his hero’s head. An example of this occurs during Humbert’s meeting with the 
headmistress Miss Pratt, who uses psychoanalytic techniques to incorrectly attribute 
Dolores’ misbehavior to her “sexual thoughts for which she has no outlet” (196). By 
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including Miss Pratt’s failed analysis, Nabokov depicts psychological practices as 
ineffective and thereby undercuts the validity of Humbert’s alleged illness. Scorning the 
same discourse his hero attempts to appropriate, he implicitly criticizes Humbert’s self-
diagnosis and presents it as an inadequate explanation for his behavior. To be sure, 
Humbert does not believe in his psychological excuses. Rather, he exploits the discourse 
for its perceived credibility, imposing it onto his desires in order to re-present his urges in 
terms that are familiar, tenable, and above all, forgivable.  
In both his subversion of demonism and psychological discourse, Nabokov 
demonstrates language’s ability to filter our perception and distort our reception of 
content. As opposed to concealing Humbert’s verbal manipulation, he distills his hero’s 
justifications into concrete discursive categories, uncovering both their deceptive power 
as well as their limitations. In this respect, he transforms each argument into an “object of 
verbal artistic representation” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 332). Outlining the edges of each 
respective discourse, he “reveals not only the reality of a given language but also… its 
potential, its ideal limits and its total meaning conceived as a whole, its truth together 
with its limitations” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 356). In other words, Nabokov exposes 
Humbert’s discourses to be just that: discourse. Far from reflecting reality, his prose 
reimagines the world by means of discourse, refracting its features and thereby producing 
something entirely new. Thus, instead of portraying Dolores as she exists in reality, 
Humbert offers us with his own creation, Lolita, a powerful girl-demon capable of 
seduction and chaos. By providing us with this discursive awareness, Nabokov empowers 
us to examine Humbert’s story at a metalinguistic level. Illustrating the dangers of 
discourse, he prompts us to reflect on its capability to persuade, to deceive, to reconstruct, 
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and thus misrepresent. Nevertheless, his efforts to highlight the corruptive potential of 
discourse do not result in the formation of an ethical stance but give us the information 
necessary to make an ethical judgement ourselves. Faced with Humbert’s deceitful use of 
language, we are able to see past his alluring prose and infer the abusive actions that he 
so cleverly obscures. Just the same, we must make this decision to overcome the text’s 
aesthetic value ourselves, confronting the ethical dilemma of the novel without 
Nabokov’s express guidance.  
Even with this knowledge in mind, however, Nabokov complicates our attempts 
to scrutinize Humbert’s misrepresentation of Dolores by posing Humbert as an artist and 
poet. Over and again, Humbert self-identifies as an “artist” (71) intent on capturing 
Dolores’ memory in the pages of his memoir. This argument becomes particularly 
pronounced at the end of the novel, where Humbert offers his manuscript as amends for 
his cruel behavior. After realizing the harm he caused to Dolores, he finds solace in his 
creative output and claims that his writing will preserve her “in the minds of later 
generations” (309). As he goes on to proclaim: “I am thinking of aurochs and angels, the 
secret of durable pigments, prophetic sonnets, the refuge of art. And this is the only 
immortality you and I may share, my Lolita” (309). For Humbert, the memoir gifts 
Dolores with everlasting life. Through the act of writing, “he seeks to transmute the 
transient sorrows and joys of earthly life into something timeless and transcendent. He 
cannot restore Dolly’s childhood or repair the damage he has done her, but he can attempt 
some faint recompense.” (Connolly, Reader’s Guide 45). In this respect, Humbert spins 
his misrepresentation of Dolores into an act of benevolence, an enduring testament to 
both his artistic prowess and good will. While Humbert’s appeals to art may come across 
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as insufficient, his rationale is not completely devoid of reason. After all, could we have 
even reached the end of the memoir had we not enjoyed his writing for its aesthetic 
value? As even Ray concedes in the foreword, without Humbert’s actions there would 
never “have been this book,” an admission that underscores the irreconcilable conflict 
between the novel’s aesthetic beauty and ethical quandaries (5). So does Humbert’s prose 
justify his behavior? And if not, how are we to account for our enjoyment of the text 
without losing sight of Humbert’s misconduct? 
To these questions, Nabokov provides no solutions but forces his readers to settle 
these opposing positions for themselves. By making the impermissible a source of 
pleasure, he prompts us to contemplate discourse as an artistic form and offers his text as 
a space of profound reflection, where we are left to consider verbal art for all its aesthetic 
and ethical implications. As Constantine Muravnik contends, “Nabokov's professed 
‘aesthetic bliss’ equally does not turn us away from reality but, on the contrary, opens it 
up in one’s aesthetic contemplation of the world” (81). To take his assertion a step 
further, Nabokov’s approach in Lolita reveals discourse to be a necessarily aesthetic 
perspective on reality. So long as we use language to interpret the world around us, we 
must recognize its capacity to influence our perception and thus shape our ethics. Where, 
then, does this leave us with respect to Nabokov’s textual presence? Though Bakhtin’s 
discursive framework falls short of attributing Nabokov’s presence to an ethical stance, it 
nevertheless succeeds in illuminating the various ways in which he eludes a definite 
position and thrusts responsibility onto the reader instead. Between Humbert’s seductive 
prose and his own efforts to undermine his hero, Nabokov keeps the reader in a constant 
state of uncertainty that impedes any attempt to pin his presence to a single point of view. 
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In this sense, he lures his readers into an endless search for the novel’s seemingly 
nonexistent center, one that compels them to examine the ethical responsibilities 






















Conclusion: Modernism and Beyond 
 
 Although the entirety of his writing took place in the twentieth century, Bakhtin is 
in many respects a retrospective critic. Despite his insistence on the novel as a genre 
forever “in the process of unfolding,” his theory of the novel remains largely entrenched 
in the nineteenth century, tailored to the works of Dickens, Dostoevsky, Gogol, and the 
like (“Epic” 7). In what appears to be a glaring oversight, his work omits many of the 
most boundary-pushing novelists of his own century, including Joyce, Woolf, and Proust 
to name a few. Yet given what we know about Bakhtin’s intellectual life as well the strict 
censorship laws of the Soviet Union, he was more than likely familiar with the 
experimental fiction of his time. As Stanislav Shvabrin suggests in Between Rhyme and 
Reason, Bakhtin “clearly had in mind the current state of the Russian novel at large” 
while penning his theories and was intimately familiar with contemporary material, from 
Andrei Bely’s experimentation with the genre to Aleksei Tolstoi’s traditionalist 
stylizations of its nineteenth century paragons (12). In any case, the question lingers: Is 
Bakhtin’s theory of authorial presence only applicable to pre-twentieth century literature? 
Or can his ideas be extended to modernism, post-modernism, and beyond? While his 
framework traces a clear outline of Dostoevsky’s presence in The Brothers Karamazov, 
his axiological approach begins to falter when applied to Absalom, Absalom! and Lolita. 
Yet tempting as it is to dismiss his theories in the face of these novels, his framework 
nevertheless helps us define the problems inherent to authorial presence and opens each 
text to profound discursive examination.  
 As a cornerstone of nineteenth century literature, The Brothers Karamazov proves 
particularly receptive to a Bakhtin’s approach. Though he goes perhaps too far in his 
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democratic vision of polyphony, his discursive framework provides a neat blueprint of 
Dostoevsky’s textual position with respect to “Everything is permitted.” By passing 
Ivan’s thesis through a series of undermining discourses, he presents the idea as both 
impractical and immoral. From Zosima’s spiritualism to Smerdyakov’s chilling 
rationalizations, he weakens and deflates the idea, ultimately extinguishing it with Ivan’s 
final comatose state. In this way, he exploits his structural advantage over his characters 
and guides the reader’s reception of the idea by means of discourse. To quote Georg 
Lukács, Dostoevsky’s “ethical intention” reverberates throughout the novel, “visible in 
the creation of every detail and hence… an effective structural element of the work itself” 
(72). This being the case, Bakhtin’s approach enables us to break the text down to its 
constituent parts and uncover Dostoevsky’s deliberate staging of the idea’s demise.  
 Whereas The Brothers Karamazov seems to conform to Bakhtin’s axiological 
approach, both Lolita and Absalom, Absalom! confront his theories with far greater 
resistance. Between Nabokov’s subsuming narrator and Faulkner’s indeterminable 
depiction of the past, both authors make a conscious effort to disrupt the content-form 
relationship as a means to provoke discursive reflection in their readers. This, of course, 
deals a hefty blow to any reader bent on circumscribing their textual presences. Calling 
the authority of language into question, both novels engender what Bakhtin describes as a 
“crisis of authorship,” where the “position of the author’s outsidedness is shaken and is 
no longer considered essential” (“Author and Hero” 203). With no concrete connection 
between what is being presented and how it is presented, the author’s position begins to 
vanish as we lose our grasp on the text. Thus, authorial presence in Lolita and Absalom, 
Absalom! can no longer be conceived of as a discernible ethical stance but must be 
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adapted to account for each writer’s attempts to destabilize language and its relation to 
reality. In other words, these novels effectively push Bakhtin’s framework to the brink of 
its applicability and highlight its limitations as an approach to authorial intent.  
 In Lolita, this crisis manifests in Nabokov’s discursive presentation of pedophilia. 
At first glance, Nabokov comes dangerously close to tolerating – if not idealizing – 
Humbert’s repeated abuse of Dolores Haze. From the fanciful prose to the narratorial 
point of view, he seems to structure the text in a way that romanticizes Humbert’s actions 
and thus invites the reader to take a sympathetic stance toward his protagonist. Yet upon 
further inspection, Nabokov’s discursive arrangement suggests a far more complex story. 
Despite Humbert’s seductive justifications for his actions, Nabokov undercuts his 
reasoning by satirizing his discursive choices. Whether deriding psychology or 
demonology, he turns Humbert’s discourses against him and exposes their potential to 
misrepresent the humanity of others. In this manner, he fills the novel with discursive 
reflexivity and encourages the reader to regard Humbert’s descriptions as deceptive, 
corruptive, if not entirely false. All the same, Nabokov’s deliberate subversion of 
language falls short of outright condemning Humbert’s actions. In this absence of a 
definitive authorial stance, he leaves Humbert’s culpability unresolved and thrusts the 
novel’s ethical dilemma onto the reader. In this tension between ethics and aesthetics, 
content and from, Nabokov illustrates the distortive powers of language, problematizes 
the very possibility of taking an ethical position via discourse, and charges his readers 
with the task of evolving an ethical stance in reaction to an aesthetic phenomenon.  
 If Nabokov intends to push the relationship between discourse and reality, then 
Faulkner succeeds in severing this connection altogether in Absalom, Absalom!. As 
Weaver 83 
opposed to relating the Sutpen story directly, he cobbles the narrative together out of 
conflicting discursive perspectives, ranging from demonism to epic diction. With each 
additional account, he layers the Sutpen legacy with the biases of its narrators and 
presents history as a linguistic construct distinct from the past. History, in other words, is 
pure discourse. Far from preserving the past, language imposes it with narratives and 
consequently transforms it into something entirely new. By burying the Sutpen tale with 
language, then, Faulkner not only blocks our access to the real but questions discourse’s 
very capability of reflecting any historical reality other than their own. Needless to say, 
his unstable depiction of the past hinders any attempt to define his textual presence as an 
axiological relation to content. Depriving us of any reliable footholds, he demonstrates 
the difficulty of examining the past through language and thereby eludes taking a 
definitive position himself.  
 As representatives of post-dostoevskian developments in the novelistic genre, 
Absalom, Absalom! and Lolita exemplify the problems implicit to Bakhtin’s approach. 
Turning away from moralizing, both Faulkner and Nabokov defy Bakhtin’s axiological 
model and prove authorial presence to be far more expansive than an attributable ethical 
stance. Yet while Bakhtin’s framework fails to pinpoint Faulkner and Nabokov’s exact 
position in their texts, that is not say their novels render his theories ineffective. On the 
contrary, his approach opens both texts to deeper examination and brings to light the 
challenges and complexities inherent to determining authorial intent. Moreover, his 
emphasis on discursive juxtaposition provides a valuable method to analyze the various 
ways in which novelists test the content-form relationship. As he himself recognizes, his 
approach to the novel produces “an awareness of the disassociation between language 
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and intentions, language and thought, language and expression,” a tension both Faulkner 
and Nabokov attempt to draw out in their works (“Discourse” 369). In this respect, his 
theories enable us to circle the author’s creative aims and therefore lead us closer to 
uncovering her textual presence. In the case of both Absalom, Absalom! and Lolita, they 
illuminate the text as a space of profound linguistic reflection and allow us to better 
understand the author’s attitude toward language, both as a form of art and way of 
understanding the world.   
 So where, then, does this leave us with respect to Bakhtin’s relevance today? Is 
his approach outdated, woefully ill-equipped to tackle the challenges of twentieth century 
literature, or do his theories endure in the face of modernist techniques? Regardless of 
whether or not Bakhtin’s framework succeeds in discovering textual presence, it 
nevertheless remains invaluable as a hermeneutic tool. Less of a scalpel than a diagnostic 
device, his ideas identify the difficulties associated with deducing authorial intent and 
leave us with a more nuanced understanding of textual presence. Whether this analysis 
leads us to a concrete conclusion, such as in The Brothers Karamazov, or merely 
complicates authorial presence as we see in Absalom, Absalom! and Lolita, it nonetheless 
inches us closer to defining what is otherwise an inexplicable and evasive concept. “At a 
time when ‘the author’ has long been presumed dead, and when the words ‘hero’ and 
‘aesthetics’ have a certain anachronistic ring to them, [Bakhtin’s theories] will require of 
its readers an extra degree of imagination and sympathy” (Holquist ix). Those willing to 
appreciate his ideas for all their strengths and weaknesses will find themselves with a 
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